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Localism and Involuntary Annexation:
Reconsidering Approaches to
New Regionalism
Christopher J. Tyson*
''Involuntary" annexation-the ability of cities to expand their tem"to1y unilaterally by
extending their boundaries-JS one of the most controversial devices in land use law. It is under
attack in virtually every state where it exists. Involuntary annexation is a direct threat to
"loca/Jsm," the belief in small, autonomous units of government as the optimum /Orum /Or
expressing democratic freedom, /Ostering community, and organizing local govemment.
Localism has been justifiably faulted with spuning metropolitan fragmentation and the
attendant challenges it creates for regional govemance. This cn"tique JS at the center of "New
Regionalism," a movement of scholars and policy makers rocused on promoting regional
govemance stroctures that respect the cultural draw of localism while correcting ror its
deficiencies. New Regionalism emphasizes bottom-up, voluntaJy govemance structures and
dis1111sses approaches like involuntary annexation as politically infrasible. Both t;pes o[
approaches !ace considerable political challenges, but there are aJgUEJb/y more examples of well
fimctioning involuntary annexation regimes than there are successful models of New
Regionalism. U.11ile involuntary annexation has been cn"tical to the success of metropolitan
regions in Texas and North Carolina, many regard it as a violation of the liberty and freedom
that comes with property dghts. Property nghts are rooted in instinctive and culturally
reinforced notions of personal identity and the inviolability of ownership. Localism extends this
logic to mllll icipal identity. The hostJJity toward involuntary annexation, thererore, can be
understood as a response to the taking of a persons perceived dght to express individual identity,
gmup identity, status, and ownership through municipal identity. This notion of municipal
JdenD/y as property threatens to undennine both existing involuntary annexation regimes as well
as future New Regionalist proposals. While New Regionalism has well-reasonedjustificatJ011s
for rocusing on more-voluntary, bottom-up govemance structures, involuntary annexation
remains a potent tool ror facilitating regional governance and is worthy of defense and
preservation.
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The subject of state and local government law is less about
substantive legal doctrine than it is about institutional design. Decisions
that affect localities can be made at a variety of levels-federal, state, or
local-and by a variety of institutions-executive, administrative,
legislative, or judicial-within each level. State and local government
law involves the location of decision-making authority within this
matrix. The subjects that define this area of law-such as the scope of
municipal autonomy and the resolution of interlocal conflict and
cooperation-are primarily interesting not for their substantive content,
that is, what should be decided, as much as for what they say about who
should decide.1
The metropolitan-boundary problem has long been a defining
issue in local government law.2 Increasingly, metropolitan regions are
arranged around municipal boundaries that separate central city and
suburban local governments from each other.
patchwork of governments throughout a region.

The result is

a

This fragmentation

1.
See, e.g., Clayton P Gillette, Expropriation and Institutional Design in State and
Local Govemment Law, 80 VA. L. REv. 625, 625 (1994).
2.
See, e.g, Michelle Wilde Anderson, Mapped Out ofLocal Democracy, 62 SrAN.

L. REV. 931 (2010) (suggesting state-level reforms to provide local governments with better

tools to address regional problems); Richard Briffault, The Local Govemment Boundary
Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1115 (1996) (discussing the inability of
local governments to address regional issues); Gerald E. Frug, Beyond Regional Govemmen�
115 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1763 (2002) (proposing that the solution to regional governance problems
.
is a European Union-like institution made up of local governments); Christopher J. Tyson,

Annexation and the Mid-Size Metropolis: New Insights in the Age ofMobile Capital, 73
PITT. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012).
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not only leads to the uneven distribution of regional burdens and social
stratification, but it allows provincialism to fiustrate interregional

collaboration and metropolitan development.3
Moreover, different
metropolitan municipalities take on identities that r eflect disparate
levels of market value, social worth, political power, and cultural
meamng.
Social and consumer behavior
responds to these dynamics.

within metropolitan regions

For instance, the choice of where to

pur chase or rent a home is t y pically linked to other decisions that
ultimately impact quality of life, wealth creation, social status, political
power, and perceived safety and well-being.4 This drives the decision
making process around locating in the central city, suburb
B.

A, or suburb

Consequently, municipal boundaries define the territorial and

socially constructed bounds of community and locational choice.
facilitate

They

wildly

esoteric,

y et

painfully

tangible

and

consequential, distinctions between communities that signal value to
the market as well as to civil society.

They inform the design and

operation of local government law at foundational levels--chiefly in
the development of the laws governing municipal-boundar y formation
and reformation.

Municipal-boundary laws-specifically a state's

annexation laws-are central to how locational value is created and
preserved.
The impact of location decisions on local government law has
been explored in the zoning context.5 How municipal-boundary laws
impact these social and economic processes, however, receives less
attention. Annexation laws regulate the manner and degree to which
municipal boundaries can be extended. Most states require some form
of popular sanction by the residents or property owners living in an

3.
See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part D-Localism and Legal Theory,
90 COLUM. L. REv. 346, 357-64 (1990) (discussing the social and demographic changes that
influenced the evolution of the legal classification of suburbs and the manner in which it has
limited the ability of metropolitan regions' central cities to grow).

4.

There has long

been a national policy

supporting

home

ownership and

considerable federal resources have been dedicated to creating accessible, stable, and

See generally Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2. 0, I 02
REv. 1047 (2008) (proposing a comprehensive system of risk allocation to improve

appreciating residential markets.

Nw. U. L.

homeownership as an investment for homebuyers).

5.
See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, The Steep Costs of Using
Noncumulative Zoning To Preserve Land for Urban Manufacturing, 7 7 U. Cm. L. REV. 249
(2010) (arguing against noncumulative zoning as a means to promote urban manufacturing);
Daniel B. Rodriguez & David Schleicher, The Location Market, 1 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 63 7
(2012) (discussing the tension between zoning laws and the private market for location).
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area proposed for annexation before the annexation can take effect. 6
This enables residents who migrate out of a central city to stop the
central city's expansion into the unincorporated areas where they have
resettled. Central city emigration typically involves wealthier residents
who are highly mobile and often hostile to wealth redistribution. They
typically pay more in taxes than they require in government services.
Consequently, their exit from the central city diminishes its tax base. It
is in the central city's best interest to recapture these residents and their
tax dollars.

Expanding the taxable territory is the only way for a

central city to fund existing public service and amenity levels as well
as maintain its

share

of

redistributed state

and

federal funds.

Consequently, annexation law has emerged as a bulwark against the
ability of metropolitan-area central cities to expand their territory in a
manner that allows them to balance the books.
Not all states have conditioned boundary expansion on popular
support.

There are a few states that have taken specific measures to

limit the possibility that their central cities will be boxed in by the
suburban municipalities formed on their borders by giving them
unilateral

or

near-unilateral

power

to

extend

their

boundaries.1

"Involuntary" annexation-also known as "forced" or "unilateral"
annexation-is a subset of annexation law that allows a municipality to
extend its borders to encompass new territory w ithout the consent of
the residents or property owners in the annexed area.

Seven states

have some version of this feature in their annexation regimes: Indiana,
Kansas, Kentucky, Nebraska, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas.
In all seven of these states, involuntary annexation provisions have
faced or are facing some level of organized opposition.8
The controversy over involuntary annexation stems from widely
held beliefs about the relationship between government, territory,
identity, and freedom.

In the minds of most Americans, being in the

right school district, neighborhood, suburb, or district affects individual
and family life chances and outcomes. The location decisions made by
individuals, families, and firms alike incorporate presumptions about
wealth,

privilege,

poverty,

disad vantage,

status,

and

stigma.9

6.
See, e.g., Mary M. Edwards, Understanding the Complexities ofAnnexation,
J. PLAN. LITERATURE 1 19, 124 (2008).
7.

23

See, e.g., Russell M. Smi t h, An Examination ofMunicipalAnnexation Methods

in North Carolina, 1990-2009, 52 SOUTHEASTERN GEOGRAPHER 1 64, 1 66-67 (2012).

8.
See infra Part II.
9
See generally Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the l)'ranny ofthe
Favored Quarter: Addressing the Barners to New Regional
ism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985 (2000)
·
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consequences
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of

these

distinctions ascribe a level of risk to location choice. This notion of
risk reflects relative levels of financial and political access, freedom,
and authority that accrue to an individual or family based on the
implications of their location choice or municipal identity.
Municipal identity is more than the unincorporated territory or
local government unit within which one's property is located.

It

encompasses notions of value and worth that operate in the modern
metropolis

and that

are attached to

a

particular

municipality.
Municipal identity implicitly involves matters of real property and by
extension, notions of fundamental rights in and to the municipal
identity attached to real property. How municipal identity operates is
inextricably tied to municipal boundaries because it is given legal and
political force through the design of a state's annexation regime.10
Using involuntary annexation to limit location choice offends
widely held values of liberty, freedom, and property rights popularly
and culturally understood as municipal identity. This phenomenon has
been characterized as "localism," and the hostility toward involuntary
annexation illustrates the manner in which localism has come to be
expressed through the logic, rhetoric, and methodology of properiy
rights.11 While there is no recognized constitutional property right to
local self-government, the rhetoric of property rights dominates the
arguments against involuntary annexation and frames the public's
conception of municipal identity as property.12 Understanding these

(arguing that a "favored quarter" of the population in most metropolitan areas has captun:d
most of the benefits of the regional economies).
10.
See, e.g., so urces cited supra note 2.
11.

See infra Part

12.

See Richard Briffault,

Ill.

Our Localism:

Part

1-lhe Structure' oF Lorn!

Govermnent Law, 90 COLUM. L. REv. I, 7-8 (1990) ("As a matter of conventional legal

the ory the states enjoy complete hegemony over local governments. Under both fcJeral and
,

state constitutional law, local governments h a ve no rights against their states. Localities may
not assert the contracts clause, the equal protection clause or the privileges and immunities
clause against their state governments. Nor do the residents of local governments have any
inherent right to local self-government: local residents may not assert a constitutional claim
to belong to a particular local government or to have any local government at all. The formal
legal status of a local government in relation to its state is summarized by the three concepts
of 'creature,' 'delegate' and 'agent.' The local government is a creature of the state.

only by

lt exists

an act of the state, and the state, as creator, has plenary power to alter, expand.

contract or abolish at will any or all local units. The local government is a delegate of the
state, possessing only those powers the state has chosen to confer upon it.

Absent any

� pecific limitation in the state constitution, the state can amend, abridge or retract any power
tt has delegated, much as it can impose new duties or take away old privileges. The local
government

is an agent of the state, exercising limited powers at the local level on behalf of

the state. A local government is like a state administrative agency, serving the state in its

[Vol. 87:297
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developments is important for the emerging discussion on "New
Regionalism," which has largely discounted annexation's role

m

remaking metropolitan governance.
New

Regionalism

promotes

the

voluntary

accession

of

metropolitan governments into region-wide governance structures that
control some, if not all, of the functions of metropolitan governance.
New Regionalism encourages the collaborative and participatory
development of bottom-up remedies to address the inequality that
results from metropolitan fragmentation.

New Regionalism prefers

that local governments choose to cede power voluntarily to a region
wide entity, which runs counter to the decidedly top-down, state
imposed design of involuntary annexation.13
Annexation,

in

general,

is

controversial,

annexation is viewed by many as extreme.

but

involuntary

It is understandably

susceptible to criticism for being politically infeasible, which explains
the lack of attention it receives from New Regionalist scholars and
policy makers.14 Ironically, New Regionalism's push for a movement
toward regional governance structures has, to date, proven to be just as
politically dubious as expanding involuntary annexation.

The latter,

however, has proven useful in mitigating the effects of urban sprawl
and metropolitan fragmentation.15
Although involuntary annexation is under attack in the states
where it remains, it deserves to be preserved and included in the New
Regionalist discussion of pathways to more comprehensive and
equitable forms of metropolitan governance.

If this is to happen,

however, it is necessary to understand how the legitimacy of localism
and the attendant notions of property rights in municipal identity have

narrow area of expertise, but instead of being functional specialists, localities are given
jlllisdictions primarily by territory, although certain local units are specialized by function as
well as territory." (footnotes omitted)).
13.
See Lisa T. Alexander, The Promjse and Penis of"New Reg1ona11st"Approaches
to Sustainable Conmnmjties, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629, 632-33 (2011) ("New regionalism
has been defined as 'any attempt to develop regional governance structures or interlocal
cooperative agreements that better distribute regional benefits and burdens."' (quoting
Cashin, supra note 9, at 2027-28)). Minnesota's Minneapolis-St. Paul ("Twin Cities") region
is frequently lauded as a model of regional governance and an example of the New
Regionalist ideal. Since 1994, the Metropolitan Council of the Twin Cities has exercised

jurisdiction over all sewer, transit, and land use planning for the seven counties and 188 cities
within the Twin Cities metropolitan region. See, e.g., MYRON 0RFIELD, METROPOLITICS: A

REGIONAL AGENDA FOR COMMUNITY AND STABILITY 13 (1997); J anice c.
Griffith, Regional
Governance Reconskiered, 21 J.L. & POL. 505, 532-33 (2005).

1 4.
S.ee Cashin, supra note 9, at 2027 ('The 'New Regionalist' agenda accepts
. .
.
poht1cal fut1hty
of seeking consolidated regional government.").
15.

See intm Part III.

the
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developed and been sustained in a manner that has undennined the
legitimacy of involuntary annexation as a worthwhile component of
not only statewide land use regimes, but also the scholarly discourse
around metropolitan governance.
Part II of this Article provides an overview of the existing state
annexation regimes that permit involuntary annexation and the various
designs of involuntary annexation provisions in those states.

Part III

considers the various ideological, political, and legal underpinnings of
the backlash to involuntary annexation. Specifically, this Part explores
the broader antistatist and property rights foundations of localism.

It

also introduces and explores the idea of municipal identity as property.
Part IV addresses the manner in which involuntary annexation has
been omitted from the broader New Regionalism debate.
II.

OVERVIEW AND HISTORY OF INVOLUNTARY ANNEXATION
Annexation is a significant area of local government law

affecting the ability

of cities to retain residential and business

taxpayers who settle outside of the city's municipal boundaries but
within its metropolitan region.16 Urban historian Kenneth Jackson has
stated, "Without exception, the adjustment of local boundaries has
been the dominant method of population growth in every American
city of consequence."11 Boundary expansion was the largest driver of
municipal expansion in the second half of the t wentieth century, with
almost four-fifths of 521 central cities expanding their boundaries by
10% or more between 1950 and 2000.18 Recent data released by the
United

States

Census

Bureau

show

that

"more

than

93,000

annexations occurred in the United States bet ween 2000 and 2010,
resulting in the addition of over 8 million acres of territory to existing
municipalities.''19
Virtually every state's annexation regime provides more than one
method for annexing land, and most provisions require the consent of
the property owners in the area proposed for annexation. In the states
where annexation is the most controversial, the controversy is almost
16.

Annexation law is controlled by the states, and therefore, there are fifty different

approaches to annexation.

For a discussion of annexation, see, for example, David Rusk,

Annexation and the Fiscal Fate of Cities, in THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION METROPOLITAN
POLICY PROGRAM 1, 9-11 (2006).
17.
KENNETH J. JA CKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER:
UNITED STATES 140 (1985).
18.

DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS :

2003).
19.

Smith, supra.note 7, at 165.

A

THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE

CENSUS 2000 UPDATE 12 (3d ed.

[Vol.

TULA NE LA W RE VIEW

304

always due to involuntary annexation provisions.20
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No two states '

involuntary annexation provisions are alike, and over time states have
modified their involuntary annexation provisions to reflect shifting
public sentiment toward municipal-boundary expansion.
Involuntary annexation provisions are largely defined by the
absence of a requirement that the local resident, voter, or property
owner consent to the enactment of a proposed annexation.�'

T hey

effectively provide municipalities a unilateral or near-unilateral ability
to extend their boundaries to encompass unincorporated territory.
While controversial, involuntary annexation is likely a small fraction of
the total annexation activity occurring in states with involuntary
annexation provisions. Only one study has analyzed the frequency of
annexation activity by method of annexation. 22 That study found that
roughly

9%

of annexations conducted in North Carolina between

1 990

and 2009 were involuntary annexations.23

States that incorporate some meaningful version of a unilateral

municipal-determination feature fall within the Article's definition of
an "involuntary annexation state."

Arguably any qualification on

unilateral power calls into question its unilateral nature, but Indiana,
Kansas, Kentucky, Nebraska, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas
have managed to maintain fairly broad and permissive involuntary
annexation

provisions. 24

Qualifications

on

that

power

include

significant preconditions and requirements that must be satisfied
before a municipality can exercise its involuntary annexation powers or
include opportunities for a popular veto of involuntary annexations
after they take effect.

These provisions are designed in a variety of

20.

See infra Part IL

21.

Most states require a threshold of consent by residents, property owners, or both

as a condition of effecting a valid annexation.
referendum vote.

This can take the form of a petition or a

These requirements are explicit in statutory design and their presence

makes it impossible to unilaterally extend municipal boundaries.

See, e.g., LA. R.Ev. STAT.

§ 33: l 72(A)(l )(a) (2012) ("No ordinance enlarging the boundaries of a municipality shall be

valid unless, prior to the adoption thereof, a petition has been presented to the governing body
of a municipality containing the written assent of a majority of the registered voters and a
majority in number of the resident property owners as well as twenty-five percent in value of

the property of the resident property owners within the area proposed to be included in the

corporate limits, all according to the certificates of the parish assessor and parish registrar of
voters.").
22.

SeeSmith, supra note 7, at 166-67.

23.

See1datl70tbl.l .

24.

As of the conclusion of North Carolina's 2012 legislative session, the state no

longer has an involuntary annexation regime.

The pioneering design and effectiveness of

North Carolina's involuntary annexation provisions (despite those provisions' relatively recent

repeal) warrant the state's inclusion in this article's classification of involuntary annexation

states.

See infta Part II.E.
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ways, and each construction reflects the state's conception of the role
of boundary formation and management in shaping its local
communities.

Some important caveats are in order.

boundary

Local government

policy varies considerably in each of the fifty states.

The

following is not meant to be an exhaustive summary of all approaches
to annexation, but rather a description of those regimes that best
resemble what this Article considers to confer unilateral or near
unilateral rights over boundary

expansion to local governments.

Additionally, and as the footnotes make clear, annexation is closely
related to municipal incorporation law, which is not the focus of this
Article and, therefore, is not directly addressed.

A.

Indiana
Indiana's annexation

involuntary

statute

does

or unilateral annexation.

not

allow

expressly

for

It does allow municipalities to

extend their boundaries by ordinance, however.

"Generally, the

annexation process formally begins when a municipality adopts an
ordinance annexing territory
process can begin

.

. ."25
.

"However, . . . the annexation

when an individual files a petition with a

municipality requesting that the municipality annex his or her property
"26
If by ordinance, a municipality may adopt it only after its
•

•

•

•

legislative body has held a public hearing concerning the proposed
21
annexation.
The statute provides that individuals attending the hearing must

have the opportunity

to testify and that notice of the hearing must be

sent to each property owner in the area proposed for annexation and to
the owners of property adjacent to public rights of way included in the
area to be annexed.28 It is possible, however, that the ordinance can be
passed against the opposition of property owners in an area proposed
for annexation. 29 This possibility essentially gives the municipality the
opportunity to involuntarily annex new territory.

25.
City of Carmel v. Steele, 836 N.E.2d 967, 972 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (citing IND.
CoDE §§ 36- 4-3-3 to -4 ).
26.
Id at 972-73; see IND. CODE§ 36-4-3-5(a) (2012).
.
27.
See IND. CODE § 36-4-3-2.l(a) ("The municipality shall hold the public heanng
not earlier than sixty (60) days after the date the ordinance is introduced. All interested
parties must have the opportunity to testify as to the proposed annexation." ).
.

28.
29.

Seeid §§ 36-4-3-2.1 to -2.2, 36-4-3-3.
Seeid
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Under the ordinance option, municipalities must meet certain
threshold conditions. The first is contiguity. 30 Under Indiana's statute,
"territory sought to be annexed may be considered 'contiguous' only if
at least one-eighth

( 118)

of the aggregate external boundaries of the

territory coincides with the boundaries of the annexing municipality."3'
Additionally, the municipality must adopt a fiscal plan prior to giving
notice of the proposed annexation to the affected property owners.12
The fiscal plan must show "[t]he cost estimates of planned ser vices to
be furnished to the territory to be annexed[,] itemized estimated costs
for each municipal department or agency[, t]he method or methods of
financing the planned services[,] how specific and detailed expenses
will be funded[, and t]he plan for the organization and extension of
services."13
Indiana's implicit involuntar y approach includes a the property
owner "check" on involuntary annexation that is triggered once the
annexation is complete.

Once an annexation ordinance has been

adopted and published, the affected property owners have ninety days
to file a remonstrance.34 The remonstrance must include the signatures
of

"(A) at

least sixty-five percent (65%) of the owners of land in the

annexed ter ritory; or (B) the owners of more than seventy-five percent
(75%) in assessed valuation of the land in the annexed territory."35 If
property owners in the newly annexed area take such action, Indiana's
statute specifically provides guidelines for judicial review of the
municipality's annexation decision.36

2011 legislative session, Indiana's lawmakers considered
Senate Bill 0069, which would have required that an annexing town or
city submit a petition to the court with the approval of at least 60% of
In its

the property owners in an area proposed for annexation, effectively
eliminating the involuntary annexation option.37

The legislation also

considered another petition option for municipalities, permitting them
to submit owner signatures from more than

75% of the annexed land's

See id § 36-4-3-3(a).
30.
31.
Id § 36-4-3- 1 .5 . Indiana courts have interpreted contiguity to mean that "the
territory or some part of the territory in which [a municipality] seeks to annex must be
contiguous at such time prior to the annexation ordinance and not made contiguous
contemporaneously by the language of such annexation ordinance." Steele, 836 N.E.2d at
972.
32.
See IND. CODE§ 36-4-3-3 . l (b).
33.
See1d § 36-4-3- 1 3 (d)(I) to - 1 3(d)(3).
34.
See id§ 36-4-3 - l (a).
35.
See id§ 36-4-3 - 1 l (a).
36.
See id§ 36-4-3 - 1 3 .
37.
See S.B. 69, I 17th Gen. Assemb., 1 st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 201 1 ).
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assessed value.

The

proposed

legislation

would

have

307
allowed

municipalities to annex noncontiguous territories to build an industrial
park, shopping center, or economic development project in the area.38
The legislation did not pass, but it signals the existence of forces
within the state that seek to curtail the involuntary annexation power
currently afforded to municipalities.
Indiana's backlash to involuntary annexation is seen in citizens'
movements such as the Citizens for Center Grove.39 The organization
is working toward the incorporation of the Center Grove area as a
defense mechanism to their possible annexation. It has also expressed
concerns about the impact of involuntary annexation in the state. The
organization's Web site discusses the impact of incorporation and
annexation from the aspect of the impact of municipal ser vice delivery
on property values.

W hile the Web

understandable concerns about

service

site's literature expresses
delivery,

it

also reflects

concerns about the community's tax dollars being spent beyond its
self-defined community.40

B

Kansas
Involuntary annexation in Kansas is initiated by a municipality's

adoption of a resolution stating its intent to annex land into its
borders.41 After the adoption of the resolution, notice of the proposed
annexation and of a public hearing to address the proposed annexation
is published in the official newspaper as well as sent by certified mail
to each property owner in the area of proposed annexation.42 At the
public hearing, a city representative shall present the annexation
proposal, and members of the public are given the opportunity to
comment.43
Kansas's annexation statute allows the governing body of any city
to annex land by ordinance if any one of seven conditions exists:

(1)
(2)

The land is platted, and some part of the land adjoins the city.
The land is owned by or held in trust for the city or any agency
thereof.

38.
See id
39.
See CITIZENS FOR CENTER GROVE, http://www.citizensforcentergrove.org/ (last
visited Nov. 24, 2012).
40.
See id
41.
See KAN. STAT.§ 12-520a (2012).
42.
See id§ 12-520a(c).
43.
See id§ 12-520a(e).
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The land adjoins the city and is owned by or held in trust for any
governmental unit other than another city, except that no city may
annex land owned by a county ... without the express permission
of the board of county commissioners of the county.
The land lies within or mainly within the city and has a common
perimeter with the city boundary line of more than 50%.
The land if annexed will make the city boundary line straight or
harmonious and some part thereof adjoins the city, except no land
in excess of 21 acres shall be annexed for this purpose.
The tract is so situated that 2/3 of any boundary line adjoins the
city, except no tract in excess of 21 acres shall be annexed under
this condition.
The land adjoins the city and a written petition for or consent to
annexation is filed with the city by the owner.44

Only the seventh condition facilitates a "consent" annexation.45
The other conditions essentially permit an involuntary annexation
through the passage of an ordinance by a city. While most of the
provisions place specific restraints on what lands are available for
annexation, the first condition simply requires that the land is platted
and some part of it adjoins the city. This relatively low bar enables a
municipality to annex land in an involuntary manner. Property owners
can weigh in on an annexation through the public hearing process, but
it is conceivable that a municipality could proceed with an annexation
over the objections of property owners.
Under the Kansas statute, the city is directed to consider sixteen
factors in determining the advisability of the involuntary annexation,
which include:

(3)

(4)
( 5)

(6)

44.
45.

[the] topography, natural boundaries, ... transportation links or
any other physical characteristics which may be an indication of
the existence or absence of common interest of the city and the
area proposed to be annexed;
[the] extent and age of residential development in the area to be
annexed and adjacent land within the city's boundaries;
[the] present population in the area to be annexed and the
projected population growth during the next five years in the area
proposed to be annexed;
[the] extent of business, commercial and industrial development
in the area;

Id § 12-520(a).
See id § 12-520(a)(7); see also In re Petition of Overland Park for Annexation of

Land, 736 P2d 923, 925 (Kan.
annexation statute).

1987) (describing the general application of Kansas'
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(9)

[the] tax impact upon property in the city and the area;
(10) [the] extent to which the residents of the area are directly or
indirectly dependent upon the city for governmental services and
for social, economic, employment, cultural and recreational
opportunities and resources;
(12) existing petitions for incorporation of the area as a new city or for
the creation of a special district;
(13) [the] likelihood of significant growth in the area and in adjacent
areas during the next five years;
(15) (the] economic impact on the area; and
(16) (the] wasteful duplication of services46
If the municipality can satisfy these conditions, it can proceed

with the unilateral annexation of neighboring territory.

Kansas's

annexation statutes explicitly prescribe a very narrow scope ofjudicial
review, providing that the wisdom, necessity, or advisability of an
ann exation is not a matter for consideration by the courts and that the
courts' role is limited to determining whether cities possess the
statutory authority

to annex land and whether they have acted

accordingly under that authority.47
While the statutory design of involuntary annexation is typically
more avowed, conscious, and deliberate, Kansas's approach is more
tacit and incidental. The opportunity for property owners and citizens
to be heard at a public hearing prior to the enactment of an annexation
ordinance and the sixteen statutory conditions for determining the
advisability

of

an

annexation

are

evidence

of

considerable

opportunities for public sanction of a proposed involuntary annexation
as

well as meaningful public participation throughout the process.

While property owner and citizen input is facilitated and seemingly
enco uraged throughout the annexation process, it is not required.

C.

Kentucky
In Kentucky, the limitations imposed on a municipality's

anne xation authority are tied to the municipality's classification. The
state statute assigns every city a classification ranging from First Class,
which only contains the state's largest city, Louisville, to Sixth Class,

46. See KAN. STAT.§ 12-520a(e).
47. See, e.g., Cedar Creek Props., Inc.
(Kan.1991).

v.

Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 815 P.2d 492, 495

[Vol .
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which includes every city not listed.48 The First Class consists of cities
that have, in effect, a compact with the county.49
Second

and

Third

Classes

are

granted

Cities within the

authority

to

annex

unincorporated territory, with the caveat that the annexation can be
denied if a petition in opposition is filed in a timely manner.50
Louisville, the only city within the First Class, can only annex
territory subject to the consent of the voters in the area proposed for
annexation.51

Other cities can annex territory by ordinance, but are

subject to rej ection by a petition representing at least

50%

of the

resident voters or owners of real property in the area to be annexed.52
To annex unincorporated territory, the legislative body of cities,
other than those within the First Class, must enact an ordinance stating
their intent to annex. 53 If the petition is successful, voters in the area to
be annexed will be able to vote on the question of annexation.54 The
annexation will be rejected if at least

55%

of those persons voting

oppose the annexation. 55 In the instance that an annexation is rejected,
the city must wait five years before it may attempt to annex the same
area or resubmit the question of annexation.56
Kentucky's statute is structured like a consent statute, but unlike
the most common consent statutes, property owner or resident
approval is not required to initiate the process. The possibility that

an

ordinance stating the intent to annex could withstand a resident or
voter petition against it (one that fails to gain a majority of support)
and become law gives it the quality of an involuntary annexation. The
petition requirement is effectively a remonstrance, provided it clears
the

50%

threshold.

While this is a weak form of involuntary

annexation statute, it is worth mentioning nonetheless.
D.

Nebraska
Nebraska's approach to involuntary annexation is the most

straightforward

example

of

a

scheme

built

around

leveraging

See KY. REV. STAT. § 8 1 .0 1 0 (20 1 2).
48.
49.
See id § 8 1A.005.
50.
See 1d § 8 1A.420.
51.
See 1d § 8 1A.005(a).
52.
See 1d § 8 1 A.420(2).
53.
See 1d § 8 1 A.420(1 ) ; see also Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov't v. City of
Pr?s�ect, 277 S. ':"- 3d 227, 228 (Ky. 2009) (holding that the larger city o f Louisville had
pnonty over the city of Prospect because it introduced an ordinance of annexation).
54.
See KY. REV. STAT. § 8 1A.420(2).
See id § 8 IA.420(2)(c).
55.
See id § 8 J A.460.
56.
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metropolitan economies of scale and promoting the continued growth
of the largest municipalities and, in turn, the largest metropolitan
regions in the state .

In Nebraska,

involuntary annexation

is

conditioned upon city size and, like Kentucky, a classification system.
Municipalities are classified as Metropolitan Class (containing a
population greater than

300,000),57 Primary Class (containing a
100,000 but less than 300,000),58 First Class
(containing a population greater than 5000 but less than 1 00,000),59
Second Class (containing a population greater than 800 but less than
5000),60 or Village (containing a population of greater than 1 00 but less
than 800).61
Municipalities in all classifications are granted
population greater than

involuntary annexation powers, but only with regard to cities of a
lesser class.
Metropolitan Class cities can extend their boundaries over
contiguous or adjacent land that includes or annexes a city of the First
Class with populations of less than I 0,000, any adjoining city of the
Second Class, or a Village.6�

Primary Class cities can involuntarily

annex Villages.63 First Class cities must adopt a specified annexation
resolution and plan for the extension of services before annexing
land.'"' Metropolitan Class cities, on the other hand, can extend their
boundaries at any time by ordinance.65 Nebraska's state constitution
provides that the merger or consolidation of municipalities or counties
requires the approval

of a maj ority of people voting in each

municipality or county to be merged or consolidated but explicitly
exempts annexations from such a requirement.66
With regard to annexation by cities of the Metropolitan Class,
Nebraska's statute provides:
The corporate limits of any c ity of the metropolitan class shall be
fixed and determined by ordinance by the council of such c ity. The city
council of any city of the metropolitan class may at any time extend the

corporate limits of such city over any contiguous or adjacent lands, lo�s,
tracts. streets. or highways. such distance as may be deemed proper m
RF\". STAI. * 1 4- 1 0 1 ( 20 1 2 ).
Sct'id * 1 5 - 1 0 I .
59.
S<.'C: id * 1 6- 1 0 1 .
60.
Sc.'t· id * 1 7- 1 () I .
61.
.S<.'t· 1d * 1 7-3 1 2( 1 l.
808 (Neb. 2OO?) ( c1tmg
62.
.S<.'t· City of Elkhorn \ . City of Omah a, 725 N.W2 d 792,
\1.R. RF.\. STAT. * 1 4- 1 1 7 ) .
63.
Sc.'t· �l·.B. RI'\: ST-\T. � 1 5 - 1 1 7 .
64.
Sec Elkhorn. 7 25 :\.\\".2d at 799.
65.
.X'(' �rn. Rt.\. ST.\T � 1 4 - 1 1 7.
xv; § 1 8(2)).
66.
.xx· Flkhnm. 25 :-.;. \\.· 2d at !1 1 0 ( citing NEB. CONST. art.
57.

S(.'t.' NEH.

58.

·

·
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any direction, and may include, annex, merge, or consolidate with such
city of the metropolitan class, by such extension of its limits, any
adjoining city of the first class having less than ten thousand population
or any adjoining city of the second class or village. Any other laws and
limitations defining the boundaries of cities or villages or the increase
of area or extension of limits thereof shall not apply to lots, lands, cities,
or villages annexed, consolidated, or merged under this section.67

Nebraska's annexation statute essentially allows its largest cities to
conswne smaller cities lying in their paths of expansion without having
to obtain the consent of the residents within those smaller cities.
Cities smaller than those in the Metropolitan Class have the same
right to involuntarily annex, but those rights are limited according to
certain threshold requirements. For cities in the Primary Class, the city
council may annex, by ordinance, any contiguous or adjacent lands
that

( 1 ) are

within the city's limits and that

(2) the

city serves with

water service, sanitary sewerage, or both.68 For cities of the First Class,
the requirements are even more specific.

The mayor and the city

council must both consent to the annexation ordinance, and they may
annex any adjacent or contiguous lands that are urban or suburban in
character, but not any agricultural lands.69 Cities of the First Class

are

also subject to certain procedural requirements, such as developing a
plan for the extension of city services to the area to be annexed and
holding a public hearing.10
Nebraska's annexation regime effectively allows every class of
city the opportunity to extend its borders without the consent of those
in the areas to be annexed. This policy was challenged by Citizens for
a Free Nebraska, a statewide movement of citizens organized against
forced annexation.11
November of

20 1 0,

The organization, which was dissolved in
sought to enact a law that would prevent the

annexation of a city without the majority vote from the residents in the
area to be annexed. 72 They also sought to enact a law that would allow
annexed cities to deannex themselves by a vote of the residents in the
annexed area within five years of the annexation.73

The group

67.
See NEB. REV. STAT. § 14- 1 1 7.
68.
See id § 1 5- 1 04.
69.
See id § 1 6- 1 1 7(1).
70.
See id § 1 6-1 1 7(3)-(5).
71.
See Statewide Implications, CITIZENS FOR A FREE NEB., http://www.freenebraska.
net/statewideimplications.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2012).
72.
See id; Ballot Question Committees, NEB. ACCOUNTABILITY & DISCLOSURE
CoMM'N, http://nadc.nol.org/cf/ballot_question_committees.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2012).
73.
See Ballot Question Committees, supra note 72.
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characterized involuntary annexation as a taking and established the
movement to override the state's involuntary annexation provisions as
related to principles of fairness, democracy, and representation.74
E

North Carolina

North Carolina no longer has involuntary annexation, but up until
the state's 201 2 legislative session, North Carolina was the blueprint
for involuntary annexation. For more than forty years, North Carolina
has had one of the nation's most comprehensive state land use policies.
North Carolina's annexation laws have been hailed as a model urban
policy that has been essential to the growth and economic development
of the state's metropolitan regions during the second half of the
twentieth century.75 Annexation in North Carolina stretches back to the
formation of the state 's Municipal Government Study Commission in
1958, which was convened by the state's leading municipalities
following calls for a new statewide land use policy.16 Its most
progressive feature had been its very permissive involuntary
annexation provisions.
In the past several years, North Carolinians have been engaged in
a fight over involuntary annexation. The saga produced legislative
developments and litigation that culminated during the state's 201 2
legislative session. The original statute incorporated broad provisions
for involuntary annexation. Any municipality with a population of
over 5000 could annex territory unilaterally.11 The statutory provisions
took into consideration the impact of boundary expansion on affected
property owners and exhibited considerable regard for their freedom of
location choice by building into the statute a number of constraints on
the ability of municipalities to extend their boundaries unilaterally.:•
74. See Statewide Implications, supra note 7 1 .
75. See generally Elizabeth R. Connolly, Bargain Basement Annexation: How
Municipalities Subvert the Intent ofNorth Carolina Annexation Laws, 29 N.C. CENT. L.J. 77
(2006) (discussing the inequalities that were inherent in North Carolina's involuntary
annexation Jaws); Rob Christensen, Many HBJJ North Carolina Annexation Law, NEWS &
OBSERVER, http://www.newsobserver.com/20 1 1103/27/ 1 085023/many-hail-NCS-annexation
law.html (last modified Mar. 27, 201 1, 09: 1 8 AM) (attributing the growth and economic
health of many North Carolina cities to the state's annexation Jaws). For instance, between
1960 and 20 1 0, Raleigh, North Carolina, saw its population more than triple. Neighboring
state capitals, however, did not see similar growth. Columbia, South Carolina, had a slight
population increase, while Richmond, Virginia, shrank. See id
76.
See Connolly, supra note 75, at 8 1 (discussing the history of the Municipal
Government Study Commission).
77. SeeN.C. GEN. STAT. § 1 60A-46 (20 1 0) (repealed 201 1 ).
78.
See id § 1 60A-47 (repealed 2 0 1 1 ) .
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The original statute provided strict geographical and developmental
criteria and procedures for involuntary annexation.19 North Carolina
courts have emphasized, "[M]unicipal services must be extended to
newly annexed areas in a nondiscriminatory manner, meaning that
annexed residents and property owners must receive substantially the
same services that existing [municipal] residents and property owners
receive."80
In 201 1 , the state legislature passed An Act To Reform the
Involuntary Annexation Laws of North Carolina, which brought about
several changes to the annexation process.81

First, the legislation

required that a municipality annexing under the involuntary annexation
provisions wait one year after filing a Resolution of Consideration
identifying the area under consideration for annexation before it could
adopt a Resolution of Intent to proceed with the annexation.82 Second,
the legislation introduced a Petition to Deny Annexation Ordinance
provision whereby eligible property owners opposing the annexation
would have 1 3 0 days from the date that the annexation ordinance
would be adopted to sign and obtain signatures representing 60% of
the property owners in the affected area.83 Upon timely delivery of the
petition to the municipal governing board, the annexation would be
terminated and the municipality would be prohibited from adopting
another annexation ordinance for the same area for at least three
years.84
The changes enacted by the 20 1 1 legislation essentially allowed a
majority of property owners in an annexed area to veto an involuntary
The portion of the 20 1 1 legislation establishing the

annexation.

Petition to Deny Annexation Ordinance process was ultimately struck
down as unconstitutional because it allowed only landowners to
participate in the petition as opposed to all voters.85
Goldsboro

v.

In City of

North Carolina,86 the North Carolina Superior Court held

that provisions

providing

for the Petition to Deny Annexation

Ordinance violated the sections of the North Carolina Constitution that

79.

See Nolan

v.

Village of Marvin, 624 S.E.2d 305, 306 (N.C. 2006) (citing N.C.

GEN. STAT. § 1 60A-35 to -37 (repealed 201 1 )).

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id (citing Greene v. Town ofValdese, 2 9 1 S.E.2d 630, 635 (N.C. 1 982)).
See H.R. 845, 20 1 1 -20 1 2 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 20 1 1 ).
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1 60A-58.55(a), (c) (201 1 ) (amended 20 12).
See id § 1 60A-58.55(i)(8), ( 1 1 ) (amended 2012).
See id§ 1 60A-58.55(i)( l 1) (amended 20 1 2).
City of Goldsboro v. State, Nos. 1 1 -CVS- 1 8288 & l l -CVS- 1 8230, slip op. at 2
(N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 27, 2012); 20 1 2 VIL 1440446.
86.
See id
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provide that political rights are not dependent on property,81 equal
protection of the laws,88 the ban on exclusive privilegeS,89 and the
statute's prohibition on the incorporation of a municipality within one
mile of the corporate limits of a municipality having a p opulation of
5000 or more.90

In the 20 12 legislative session, involuntary annexation suffered a
North Carolina House Bill 925 was emolled May 30,

deathblow.

201 2.91 The legislation proposed changing the annexation process to

a

referendum vote (during a municipal election) of those residing in the
annexation area.

Only registered voters o f the proposed annexation

area would be allowed to vote on the referendum. A simple majority
of all registered voters who actually voted in the referendum would be
able to kill any proposed annexation. If the proposed annexation was
denied, that proposed annexation area could not be annexed for at least
three years from the date of the referendum.92

North Caro l ina

Governor Beverly Purdue committed to neither signing nor vetoing the
bill, stating that while she "recognize[d] the need for some changes in
the annexation process, . . . reform should neither stifle the natural
growth-nor limit the role--of local govermnents.'m In the absence of
a ratification or veto, the bill automatically became law.94
The 20 1 2 legislative session also produced North C arolina House
Bill 5, which was ratified on May 3 0, 20 1 2.95 The legislation targeted
specific communities for deannexation. House Bill 5 deannexed lega l .
pending,

or

completed

annexations

in

Asheville,

Fayettev i l le.

Goldsboro, Kinston, Lexington, Marvin, Rocky Mountain, Southport.
and Wilmington.96

House Bill 5 also contained a provision that

imposed a twelve-year prohibition on any annexation attempt of the
enumerated areas.91

87.

See N.C. CONST. art. I, § 1 1 .

88.
89.

See id art. I, § 32.

90.

See 1d art. VII, § 1 .

91.
92.

Id

See id art. I, § 1 9 .

See H.R. 925, 201 1 -20 12 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 20 1 2).

93.
Gary D. Robertson, Associated Press, NC Governor Won 't Block Forced
Annexation Changes, CTPOST.COM (June 1 1 , 20 12, 5:45 PM), http://webcache.googleuser
content. com/search?q=cache:6K9n3dDdPH4J: www.ctpost.com/news/article/NC-govemor

�on-t-block-forced-annexation-changes-3623 1 82 .php+&cd= I &hl=en&ct=clnk&g I =us

(mtemal quotation marks omitted) (accessed through Google by viewing the cached version ).
94.
See id
95.
96.

See H.R. 5, 20 1 1 -2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 201 2).
See id.

97.

See id
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and the other pieces of legislation are the result of

actions by citizens' groups like the Biltmore Lake Community Action
Committee and the residents of The Gates Four community near
Fayetteville, North Carolina.98
These groups and others have
channeled their strong opposition to involuntary annexation into local
and state politics.

They have also pursued litigation.

Over the past

fifteen years, at least seven cases involving disputes over involuntary
annexation proceeclings have been litigated in North Carolina courts.99
Their

focus

on

involuntary

annexation,

however,

is

arguably

disproportionate to the extent to which such annexations actually

1 4,000 annexations
2009, only 1 3 2 1 , or

occur. As previously mentioned, of the more than
conducted in North Carolina between

9%, were involuntary annexations.
F.

1 990

and

wo

Tennessee
Involuntary annexation in Tennessee is part of a broad and

comprehensive statewide land use policy focused on encouraging
governance uniformity across a metropolitan region.101

Tennessee

municipalities may unilaterally annex adjoining territory by ordinance
when doing so will advance the state's concern for the growth,
development, public safety, and welfare of its metropolitan regions.102
If a municipality has a population greater than

1 0,000,

its ability to

annex new territory unilaterally is limited to within a two-year time
frame.103 Tennessee's annexation statute provides, in relevant part, that
an annexation will be deemed necessary under two conditions: when a

98. For a more in-depth discussion of the efforts of these groups and others, see
Tyson, supra note 2.
99.
See Carolina Power & Light Co. v. City of Asheville, 597 S.E.2d 717 (N.C.
2004); Hall v. City of Asheville, 2008 N.C. App. LEXIS 1605 (N.C. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2008);
Brown v. City of Winston-Salem, 626 S.E.2d 747 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006); Arnold v. City of
Asheville, 6 1 0 S.E.2d 280 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005); Briggs v. City of Asheville, 583 S.E.2d 733
(N.C. Ct. App. 2003); Ridgefield Props., L.L.C. v. City of Asheville, 583 S.E.2d 400 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2003); Asheville Indus., Inc. v. City of Asheville, 436 S.E.2d 873 (N.C. Ct. App.
1 993).
1 00. See Smith, supra note 7, at 1 70 tbl. 1 .
1 0 1 . TENN. CODE § 6-58- 102 (20 1 2) ("With this chapter, the general assembly intends
to establish a comprehensive growth policy for this state that: ( 1 ) Eliminates annexation or
incorporation out of fear; (2) Establishes incentives to annex or incorporate where
appropriate; (3) More closely matches the timing of development and the provision of public
services; (4) Stabilizes each county's education funding base and establishes an incentive for
each county legislative body to be more interested in education matters; and (5) Minimizes
urban sprawl.").
1 02 . See id § 6-5 1 - 1 02.
1 03 . Id § 6-5 1 - 1 02(a)(3)(A).
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majority of residents and property owners in the affected area present a
petition or when it appears the "prosperity of such municipality and
territory will be materially retarded" without the annexation. 104

This

approach explicitly provides for both property owner petitions and
municipality determinations on the need for annexation.
Tennessee 's

current annexation statute

is the result of the

invalidation of a 1 997 annexation law that made it easier for small
towns located in the fringe areas of adjacent cities to incorporate
themselves rather than be annexed by the metropolitan region's central
city.105

The 1 997 law was struck down by the Tennessee Supreme
16
Court in Tennessee Munidpal League v. Thompson, 0 after which the
state legislature created a committee to rewrite the state 's annexation
law. 107

The

revised

Comprehensive
coordinated,

annexation

law

Growth Plan, whose

efficient,

and

orderly

resulted

in

a

purpose is

"to

development

of

broader

direct the
the

local

government and its environs that will, based on an analysi s of present
and future needs, best promote the public health, safety, morals and
general welfare."108
Tennessee's annexation statute favors the growth of its largest
municipalities by affording them priority in annexation contests.
Where two municipalities incorporated in the same county seek to
annex the same territory, "the proceedings of the municipality having
the

larger

population

shall

have

precedence

and

the

smaller

municipality's proceedings shall be held in abeyance p ending the
outcome of the proceedings of the larger municipality."109
The Comprehensive Growth Plan directs each city and county to
determine an urban growth boundary to guide its development. 1 10
Under the Comprehensive Growth Plan, "A municipality possesses
104. Id
1 05. See 1 997 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1 65; Tenn. Mun. League v. Thompson, 958 S.W.2d 333,
334-35 (Tenn. 1997) (discussing the background and construction of the annexation statute);
Michael J. Stewart, Growth and !ts Implications: An Evaluation of Tennessee's Growth
Management Pla11, 67 TENN. L. REv. 983, 987 (2000) (discussing the origins of Tennessee's
Comprehensive Growth Plan and its relation to the state's annexation statute).

106.
1 07.

958 S.W2d at 338.
Among

other things, the

1997 annexation law significantly lowered the

population requirement for the incorporation of a municipality, deleted prohibitions on the
incorporation of new municipalities within certain distances of existing municipalities of a
certain population, allowed a letter from a single resident to be used in lieu o f a petition to
incorporate a new municipality, and did not require a plan for municipal services or a five
year budget. See 1 997 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1 65; Thompson, 958 S.W.2d at 334-3 5 .

1 08.
1 09.
1 1 0.

TENN. CODE § 6-58-1 07.

Id § 6-5 1 - 1 1 0.
See id § 6-58-1 04(a)(2).
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exclusive authority to annex territory located within its approved urban
growth boundaries; therefore, no municipality may annex by ordinance
or by referendum any territory located within another municipality's
approved urban growth boundaries."1 1 1
The combined effect of
Tennessee's annexation statute and its Comprehensive Growth Plan is
to incentivize urban growth planning by tying a municipality's
annexation powers to the development of its growth plan. 1 12 In addition
to incentivizing planning, this approach also puts communities on
notice that boundary expansion is possible and thereby manages
expectations about the limits of property owners' autonomy over
choosing their municipal identity. This reflects the Comprehensive
Growth Plan's aim to eliminate annexation or incorporation based on
fear. 1 13

G

Texas

The unilateral authority to annex territory in Texas traces back to
1 9 1 3 legislation, which implemented the 1 9 1 2 Home Rule
Amendment to the Texas Constitution, and gave home rule cities the
ability to annex adjacent territory.1 14 Annexation legislation was
infrequent until the enactment of the Municipal Annexation Act of
1 963, which set forth the procedures for annexation, established the
concept of extraterritorial jurisdiction (ETJ),115 and granted cities the
unilateral authority to annex areas within their ETJs.1 1 6 ETJ is defined
as the area of land extending beyond the city limits over which the city
maintains some control.111 When a city annexes additional areas, its
ETJ i s also extended.118 A city's annexation authority is limited to the
area within its ETJ. 1 19

1 1 1 . Id § 6-58-11 l (a).
112 . See id ("Within a municipality's approved urban growth boundaries, a munici
pality may use any of the methods in chapter 51 [the annexation statuteJ of this title to annex
territory; provided, that if a quo warranto action i s filed to challenge the annexation, the party
filing the action has the burden of proving that:

(1) An annexation ordinance is unreasonable
(2) The health, safety, and welfare

for the overall well-being of the communities involved; or

of the citizens and property owners of the municipality and territory will not be materially
retarded i n the absence of such annexation.").

Id § 6-58-1 02(1).
See 1913 Tex. Gen. Laws 307- 1 0.
See TEX. Loe. Gov'T CODE § § 42.001, .021 (2011).
See Our History, PLANNING & DEV. DEP'T, CITY OF Haus., http://www.houstontx.
gov/planning/AboutPD/pd_history.htrnl (last visited Nov. 24, 2012).
117. See TEX. Loe. Gov'T CODE § 42.001 .
118. Id § 42 .022.
119 . Seejd § 43.051.
113 .
114 .
115 .
1 16.
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Although all Texas municipalities are granted the authority to
annex territory unilaterally, "general law" municipalities may only
unilaterally annex under very limited circumstances.120

Home rule
municipalities, which usually have a population over 5000,121 may do
Most home rule charters
anything permitted by their charter. 122
authorize involuntary annexation. Unless the home rule municipality

owns the area to be annexed, the municipality may only annex territory

that lies within its ETJ. 123
In general, a municipality is permitted to annex a total area

equivalent to

1 0% of its incorporated area in one year. 124 Any unused

portion of that allocation may be carried over for use in the following
years.125 However, a municipality carrying over an allocation cannot
annex a total area more than the equivalent to
J?6

30% of its incorporated

c that year. area 1or

Notwithstanding a few exemptions, 1 21 every municipality must
prepare an annexation plan identifying the annexations that may
occur.

128

Any

annexation

plan

must

be

maintained

on

the

municipality's Web site.129 Once the annexation plan is adopted, there
is a three-year waiting period before it may be carried out. 130 During
this waiting period, a city may amend its annexation plan to remove
territory.

If an area is removed from the annexation plan within

eighteen months of being placed on the plan, there is a one-year
waiting period before the area may be re-added to the annexation
plan.131

If the area is removed from the annexation plan eighteen

months or later from the date it was added, there is a two-year waiting
period before the area may be re-added to the annexation plan. L' �
Within ninety days of the

adoption or amendment of a

municipality's annexation plan, the municipality must give written
notice to property owners in the affected area, certain public and
private entities that service the affected area, and certain railroad

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
1 30.
131.
1 32.

See id § 43.033.
See TEX. CONST. art. XI,§ 5; TEX. Loe. Gov'T CODE§ 5.004.
SeeTEX. Loe. Gov'T CODE§ 43.021.
See id § 43.05 1 .
See id § 43 .055(a).
See id § 43.055(b).
See id § 43.055(c).
See id § 43.052(h).
See id § 43.052(c).
See id § 43.052(j).
See id § 43.052(c).
See id§ 43.052(e).
See id
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companies. 133 Any territory contained in the annexation plan must be
annexed within thirty-one days after the expiration of the three-year
waiting period. 134 Otherwise, the city will be prohibited from annexing
the territory for five years. 135

Other procedural requirements include

the preparation of an inventory of services and facilities in the territory
proposed for annexation.136 Two public hearings must be held within
ninety days after the inventory of services and facilities has been
prepared. 137 In addition, the municipality must complete a service plan
8
for the provision of municipal services to the area to be annexed. 13
While North Carolina only recently

experienced

sweeping

legislative changes that fundamentally altered the opportunity for
involuntary annexation, Texas weathered the same backlash more than
ten years ago.

Houston's annexation of the Kingwood community

ultimately precipitated a movement to change the state 's involuntary
annexation provisions and a revision to

the

annexation regime

altogether. The suburb of Kingwood fell within Houston's ETJ at the
time of its proposed annexation in 1 996. 139 Houston's population at the
time was approximately
was

approximately

1 .8 million.14°
53,000, falling

Kingwood's population in
within

the

1 0%

threshold established by the Municipal Annexation Act. 1 4 1

1 996

population

Houston's population growth can be attributed to job creation,
1 2
immigration, and low cost of living, 4 but its territorial expansion is
largely attributable to involuntary annexation. 143

Houston took full

133. See id § 43. 052(f).
134. See id § 43.052(g).
135. See id
1 36. See id § 43.053.
1 37 . See 1d § 43.056l(a).
138. See Jd § 43. 056.
139. See Harris v. City of Houston (Harns I), IO F. Supp. 2d 721, 723 (S.D. Tex.
1 997), vacated, Harris v. City of Houston (Harns II) , 151 F.3d 1 86 (5th Cir. 1998).
140. Imad F. Abdullah, Kingwood Annexation Fight Hurts Entire Houston Area,
Hous. Bus. J. (Nov. 24 , 1996) , http://www.bizjoumals.com/houston/stories/1996/l l/25/
editorial6.html.
141. See Renee C. Lee, Aimexed Kingwood Split on Effects, Hous. CHRON. (Oct. 8,
2006, 5:30 AM), http://www.chron.com/neighborhood/hwnble-news/article/Annexed-King
wood-split-on-effects- 1 868661. php.
142. See, e.g., J.Vhen It Comes to Population Growth, Houston Is No. 1, SCI. DAILY
(July 12, 2011 ), http://www. sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/07/1 1 0712152208.htm.
1 43. See generally Scott Houston, Municipal Annexation in Texas: "Is It Really That
Complicated?, " TEX. MUN. LEAGUE, http://www.tml.org/legal_pdf/ANNEXATION.pdf (last
updated Mar. 2011) (describing the operation o f involuntary annexation in Texas). The
Houston metropolitan area is the fourth largest in the nation behind New York, Los Angeles,
and Chicago. Unlike those cities, however, Houston is largely a late-twentieth-century city
whose identity and territory have increased substantially over a relatively short period of time.
Houston is the result of a number of forces, developments, and phenomena in late-twentieth-
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advantage of this authority by aggressively annexing areas within its
ETJ.144 In August of

1 996, Houston's then-Mayor Bob Lanier proposed

that the city of Kingwood be annexed into Houston's city limits in
order to generate annual revenues for Houston of approximately

$4

million.145 The timing of Lanier's proposal was intentional because he
feared state lawmakers might strip cities of their annexation powers
during the January legislative

session.

Furthermore,

annex ing

Kingwood in December would allow Houston to collect taxes from
Kingwood residents for the entire year in

1 99 7 . 1 46

Houston's attempt to annex Kingwood was met with considerable
resistance by Kingwood, which argued that its annexation would result
in increased taxation and a decrease in the quality of municipal
services.141

Some residents of Houston countered that Houston's

strength laid in its collective, regionalized effort to attract business. In

an article reflecting the attitudes of those supporting the proposed
Kingwood annexation, Imad Abdullah asserted:
If each community is allowed to shelter itself, we will have a war of
enclaves, lobbying and stifling Houston's growth to divert it elsewhere.
Newly formed municipalities will begin to develop their own city halls,
their own convention centers and facilities. And sooner or later outlying
communities will compete with Houston for convention business.
Negative advertising will appear, contrasting the ' Livable Forest' with

the 'Home of the Homeless' downtown Houston, with unhealthy
8
consequences for all parties.14

century American life. It is a global hub for the energy sector and is home to many of the
nation's natural resources service companies.

It benefits from Texas's relatively business

friendly tax environment and the natural environment of the

Sun Belt. Its mix of employment

opportunity and cheap housing has made it a magnet for migrant workers, young families,
young professionals, and retirees seeking the amenities of suburban and suburbanesque
lifestyles. The region is known for its robust and stable regional economy, its low housing
costs, and its expanses of flat, developable land tied together by a seemingly endless stream of
highways.

For a discussion of Houston's development and significance in contemporary

urban development, see, for example, EDWARD GLAESER, TRIUMPH OF THE CITY: How OUR
GREATEST INVENTION MAKES US RICHER, SMARTER, GREENER, HEALTHIER, AND HAPPIER 455 0 (201 1).
144. See Economic Development·
Demographics, GREATER Haus. P'sHIP,
http://www.houston.org/economic-developmentJfacts-figures/demographics/index.aspx
.
visited Nov. 24, 2012).
145.

See Mayor Scoring Kingwood Coup, Haus. Bus

146.
147.

See 1d
See Annexation �xation,

bizjournals.com/houston/stories/1 996/1 2/09/editorial I .html.

hro.house.state. tx.us/focus/annex.pdf.
148. Abdullah, supra note 140.

HOUSE

.

(last

.T. (Dec. 8, 1 996), http://www.

RESEARCH ORO. (Jan. 1 3 , 1 997), http://www.
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Abdullah went on to write that Kingwood owed its success to its
proximity to Houston, not because Kingwood itself was a center of
employment. 149

Those

in

favor of Kingwood's annexation also

mentioned the need to keep Houston from becoming a "donut city."150

1 1,

Despite massive protests by Kingwood residents, on December

1 996,

the

Houston

City

Council

voted to

annex the city of

Kingwood. 151 The annexation took full effect the following day. 152 On
December

23, 1 996,

the city requested preclearance of the annexation

from the United States Department of Justice pursuant to section
the Voting Rights Act of

5

of

1 965.153

Residents of Kingwood, residents of Houston, and utility districts
joined together as plaintiffs in a federal lawsuit against the city of
Houston. Although the parties ' claims differed, they each sought the
same remedy:

a preliminary injunction of Kingwood's annexation.

The lawsuit was filed in October of
accomplished the annexation.154
annexation

violated

1 996,

before the city actually

The claimants argued that the

constitutionally

protected

Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 1 55

rights

under

the

Harris, a white resident of

Kingwood, brought claims under the Voting Rights Act of

1965,

alleging that permitting the annexation to go forward before the
January election would deprive him of his right to vote in violation of
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to
1 49.

See id.

1 5 0.

R.A. Dyer,

K1i1gwood Flap Draws Legislators ' Interest,

the United States

Hous. CHRON. (Dec.

1 2,

1 996), http://www.chron.com/CDA/archives/archive.mpl/ l 996_1 383 1 55/kingwood-flap-draws
legislators-interest.html.

See Harns I, 1 0 F. Supp. 2d 72 1 , 723-25 (S.D. Tex. 1 997), vacated, Hams U, 151

151.

F.3d 1 86 (5th Cir. 1 998).
1 52 .

See id.
See id

1 53 .

Preclearance i s a standard requirement i n the annexation process for

states falling under the purview of the Voting Rights Act. In any covered jurisdiction, section
5 of the Act requires preclearance of any attempt to change "any voting qualification or
prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting" by either the
United States Department of Justice (through an administrative procedure) or a three-judge
panel of the United States District Court for the Di strict of Columbia (through a decl aratory
judgment action).

See 42 U.S.C. § 1 973c (2006). Section 2 contains a general prohibition on
See id §§ 1973-

voting di scrimination, enforced through federal district court l itigation.

1 973a. Under section 2, any voting practice or procedure that has a discriminatory result is
prohibited.

See id § 1 9 73. The test to determine if a voting practice or procedure has a

discriminatory result is not whether the discriminatory effect is intentional. Rather, the test is
whether the electoral processes are equally accessible to minority voters.

See id The

Supreme Court has interpreted the words "any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting"
to have

a

broad meaning. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 563-67 ( 1 969);

Voting Rights Act of 1 965, §§ 2, 5, 42 U.S.C.
1 54. See Hariis II, 1 5 1 F.3d at 1 8 8.
155.

§§ 1 973- 1976.

See Hards I, 1 0 F. Supp. 2d at 723.

see
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Constitution. 156 The United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas held that his rights were not violated b ecause he had
no right to vote in the January 1 8th election; voting changes that have
not been cleared under section 5 have no effect until preclearance has
been granted.157 Because he was not deemed to have been denied any
existing right to vote, his Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment claims
158

f:ai'led.
The plaintiffs' section

2 claim was also denied on the basis that,

under the totality of the circwnstances, the plaintiffs did not prove that
the annexation diluted minorities' opportunities to participate in the
city political process and to elect representatives of their choice as was
enjoyed by white voters.

The court further found that partisan

affiliation, not race, was a better explanation for divergent voting
patterns.159 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit ruled that because the plaintiffs only prayed for injunctive
relief, and at the time of the decision the annexation had already taken
place, the plaintiffs' argument was moot and judgment was entered in
favor of the defendant.160 Judge Harold DeMoss dissented with respect
to Harris ' Fourteenth Amendment claim, however, and decried the
court's decision to allow Houston to tax the Kingwood residents
without representation.161

Judge DeMoss 's point of view was echoed

89 was introduced during the
1999 legislative session.162
Senate Bill 89 was a substantial revision to the Municipal

the following year when Senate Bill

Annexation Act of 1 963. 163 Under the revised law, large municipalities
are required to

draft

annexation

annexations that may occur.164

plans

specifically

identi fying

Any area proposed to be annexed is

subject to a three-year waiting period from the time the area is
156. See id
157. See id at 729.
15 8. See id
1 59. See id at 724-25. There was substantial evidence showing an established record
of the city's minority citizens successfully electing representatives of their choice. The court
looked at past election results between minority and nonrninority candidates and determined
that in one case, even if all 40,000 of Kingwood's residents of voting age voted for the
nonminority candidate, the minority still would have won. The court went on to say, "The
Voting Rights Act 'does not purport to guarantee or to compel minority representation in
publicly elected bodies that is proportional to the racial makeup of the political unit.'" Id at
727 (quoting Seastrunk v. Burns, 772 F.2d 1 43, 1 53 (5th Cir. 1 985)).
1 60. See Harris ll, 1 5 1 F.3d at 1 87.
161. See id at 1 9 1 (DeMoss, J., dissenting).
162. See id; S. 1 389, 76th Leg., ! st Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1 999).
163. See Houston, supra note 143, at 2 1 .
1 64. SeeTEx. Loe. Gov'T CODE § 43.052(c) (20 1 1 ).
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included in the municipalities' annexation plan.165 Senate Bill

89 also
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mandated

new

requirements

for

notice,

giving

residents

of

communities at risk of being annexed a significant opportunity to be
16
heard. 6 The most significant revision was the requirement that a
service plan be implemented, giving residents of communities to be
expectation o f the quality and quantity of municipal
Rather than
services they could expect after the annexation.1 61
annexed

an

unilaterally deciding to annex

an

area within a city's ETJ, city officials

must now initially determine whether an area they wish to annex falls
under one of the exemptions from the annexation plan requirement.168
The Municipal Annexation Act still affords extra protection to
large municipalities such as Houston. The Act provides for negotiation
for the provision of services and contracting for services in lieu of
annexation, but only for municipalities with populations of less than

1.6 million. 169

Thus, even i f the

1999 revisions had been in effect when

Kingwood was annexed, Kingwood would not have been able to
negotiate with Houston for services.

Kingwood did try to contract

with the city of Houston for services by offering
lieu of annexation,

but was

$4 million per year in

ultimately unsuccessful.110

In the

annexation's aftermath, the sentiments of Kingwood residents varied
between those who were indifferent and those who claimed they would
" 11
remain "bitter about it until the day [they die] . 1 It is noteworthy that
few .Kingwood residents felt that the annexation provided them with
any significant benefit. 112

1 65 . Id
1 66. See id § 43.052(f).
1 67. See id § 43.053.
1 68 . See id § 43.05 2(h) ("This section does not apply to an area proposed for
annexation if: ( 1 ) the area contains fewer than 1 00 separate tracts of land on which one or
more residential dwellings are located on each tract; (2) the area will be annexed by petition
of more than 50 percent of the real property owners in the area proposed for annexation or by
vote or petition of the qualified voters or real property owners as provided by Subchapter B;
(3) the area is or was the subject of: (A) an industrial district contract under Section 42.044;
or (B) a strategic partnership agreement under Section 43.075 1 ; (4) the area is located in a
colonia, as that term is defined by Section 2306.58 1 , Government Code; (5) the area is
annexed under Section 43.026, 43 .027, 43.029, or 43.03 1 ; (6) the area is located completely
within the boundaries of a closed military installation; or (7) the municipality determines that
the annexation of the area is necessary to protect the area proposed for annexation or the
muni� �pality from: (A) imminent destruction of property or injury to persons; or (B) a
co�d�tlon or u�e that constitutes a public or private nuisance as defined by background
pnnc1ples of nmsance and property law of this state.").
1 69. See id § § 43 .0562(a)(l ), 43 .0563(a).
1 70. See Lee, supra note 1 4 1 .
1 7 1 . See 1d
1 72 . See 1d
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A study of the Kingwood annexation provides valuable insight
into the arguments for and against involuntary annexation as well as
the verifiable links between a central city's boundary elasticity and
regional economic growth.

The Kingwood residents' rejection of

involuntary annexation underscored their sense of entitlement to a
separate municipal identity.

They understood it and expressed that

entitlement in the rhetoric of property rights.

III. INVOLUNTARY ANNEXATION UNDER ATTACK: WHY?
With involuntary annexations making up only

9% of the total

annexations in North Carolina over the past twenty years, and with,
presumably, similarly low levels in other states, it is hard to fathom
how the issue has managed to generate such strong opposition. It has
objectively aided central cities in maintaining the boundary elasticity
necessary to keep up with urban sprawl and spread the benefits of

a

uniform governance regime across the ever-expanding territory of the
modem metropolis.

There are complex and varied reasons why

involuntary annexation is so controversial and incites such passion
among those who oppose it. These reasons extend far beyond very
reasonable concerns about public service provisions. They implicate
issues like taxation, which, while seemingly innocuous, is connected to
broader sentiments about the role of government and social and
economic redistribution that has animated American political debate
for some decades. To a considerable degree, the staunch opposition to
involuntary annexation is rooted in a complex set of beliefs, historic
currents, and sociopolitical realities, all related to the meaning of
municipal boundaries in the contemporary, American metropolitan
experience.
Involuntary annexation essentially subordinates local prerogatives
on the formation and refonnation of municipal boundaries to larger
state-centric land use and development needs. The favoring of state
centric organization as opposed to locally driven organization reflects

the state's essential role in safeguarding the interests of all citizens and
thereby accounting for the · externalities produced through the local
land use decisions of one community vis-a-vis another.

While the

representative structure of state government allows local communities
to impact state legislation, localism casts state government and local
government as inherently disconnected and oppositional forums. In
today's political culture, the exercise of state government autonomy
over land

use

and

boundary

management-expressed

through

involuntary annexation-is popularly understood as an overreach of
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government, a breach of property rights, and a suppression of voting
rights. 1 13
Such interpretations reflect both the historical and symbolic
import of municipal boundaries in American society and in popular
conceptions of the role of government in defining and enabling
community.

They reflect the manner in which localism has become

entrenched in the public consciousness as well as the growing
antistatist sentiment in American political culture that has undermined
government legitimacy and, in turn, the ability of governments to
safeguard the public welfare. 114
The backlash against involuntary annexation is not driven solely
by impassioned lay folk or misguided notions about constitutional
rights, however.

There are valid and objective concerns with the

design and operation of some involuntary annexation regimes that
implicate the same issues of equity and fairness at the core of the
reasons in support of such laws.

For instance, critics of involuntary

annexation argue that such provisions fuel a bottom-line approach to
annexation that leads municipalities to target wealthy areas for
involuntary annexation while overlooking poorer areas where the cost
to extend municipal services would exceed the amount of tax revenue
received. 115

Also at issue are real concerns over the extension of

municipal services into newly annexed areas and the ability of the
annexing municipalities to deliver and maintain comparable services
immediately upon annexation.

Communities in areas slated for

annexation have a right to question the ability of a municipality to
deliver services it either fails to provide within its current jurisdiction
or for which it has a poor track record of managing.
There

are

other

currents

in

the

resistance to involuntary

annexation, however, that are much less obj ective and rational. They

1 73 . See, e.g., Chris Marie Farr, North Carolina Begins Debate over Forced Municipal
Ann exation, CHATHAM J. (Feb. 1 8, 2 0 1 1 ), http://www.chathamjournal.com/weekly/opinion/
letters/nc-debate-on-forced-annexation- 1 1 02 1 8 .shtml.
1 74.

Antistatism is in many ways connected to broader questions of federalism and

states' rights.

Modem conservatism is guided by a belief in limited government that is

increasingly adopting libertarian positions on the role of state and federal governments in all
aspects of society and the economy.

Most recently, groups with ties to the Tea Party have

been involved in mobilizing opposition to land use policies at the local level.
Kaufman & Kate Zemike,

See, e.g., Leslie
Activists Fight Green Projects, Seeing UN Plot, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.

4, 20 1 2 , at A l .
1 75 .

See Connolly, supra note 75, at 85-95 (discussing the communities of southern
the disparities between the affluent, predominately white areas that have

Moore County and

been annexed by the mW1icipalities of Aberdeen, Southern Pines, and Pinehurst and the
predominately black communities that comprise the unincorporated areas of the county).
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reflect several ideological and historical undercurrents that have
profoundly affected local government law and urban politics. They
revolve around concerns about the bundle of rights that are perceived
to be threatened by annexation. They are tied to the manner in which
twentieth-century social, political, and cultural developments have
been expressed through spatial organization, territorial expansion, and
the cultural significance of both local government and metropolitan
space.

Those developments can be broadly organized into three

groupings of social and political phenomena.
First, localism has long shaped the scope of autonomy granted to
municipalities by state legislatures, and the sociocultural drivers of
localism have created the urgency and perceived high-consequence
nature of the decision to leave central cities, or to locate anywhere, for
that matter. Second, annexation is viewed as a tool for the expansion
of government power through the expansion of local government
boundaries.

Consequently, much of the angst over involuntary

annexation reflects a broader antistatist sentiment.

The suspicion

about centralized government has a delegitirnizing effect on the very
role of government and, by extension, the role of public, redistributive,

and collectivist institutions in regulating social life.
Third, antistatism and localism have both influenced the growth
of the notion of a property-right-based interest in municipal identity.
The various movements against involuntary annexation implicate legal

and policy issues at the intersection of local government law and
Laws affecting both private property and the
organization of local government are largely the province of the states,
subject to certain federal constitutional limitations. These two legal
local
autonomous
and
rights
property
constructs-private
property law theory.

government--converge in the issue of localism and its enabling legal
and policy underpinning, annexation. Together these political and
popular understandings have developed into what can be viewed as a
perceived right to municipal location-the belief that one is entitled to
have their property located in a particular municipal jurisdiction and,

consequently, that the infringement of that right through the adjustment
of municipal boundaries is akin to an infringement of vested rights in

private property.

A.

Localism in Context and the Sodocultural Drivers ofFlight
Localism

encompasses

the

legal,

scholarly,

and

political

arguments in favor of greater local power and autonomy as well as the
belief that democracy requires that governing power should be
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devolved to the smallest territorial unit possible.176 Localism reflects
concerns over the sovereignty of local governments and the processes
through which that sovereignty is protected from unwanted state
intrusion. Local legal autonomy is organized around local boundaries
that delineate the reach of local tax policy pertaining to local property
in service of local needs.111
For several key reasons, localism looms large in the discourse
around involuntary annexation.

First, there are the aims of liberty,
freedom, and autonomy as expressed through the ability of citizens to
band together in voluntary and mutual associations with their
neighbors to form communities through which democratic aims and a
vision of the good life can be achieved. This dynamic of localism has
significant cultural roots and reflects the legacy of civic republicanism
and its ties to democratic citizenship, participation, and territory.
Second, localism is chiefly concerned with scale-the ratio of
democratic

access

territorial proximity.

and participatory

experience

to

spatial

Beyond a certain scale, the experience

democracy becomes more

attenuated and the virtues

government

compromised

are

arguably

in

a

and

of

of small

practical

sense.

Regionally based associations of individuals allow for the convenient
operation of democratic self-government.

Localism posits that the

appropriate scale for vesting authority over local and metropolitan
affairs is the municipal government unit, as determined by boundaries
set by

a

specific, self-defined community.

The role that scale plays in the ideology of localism is easily
understood through the example of a town hall or city council meeting.
In that forum there are several dynamics at play:

( 1 ) the desire of

citizens to enjoy meaningful participation and the very real time
constraints within which that participation must be achieved,

(2) the

ability of elected representatives to manage constituent needs within a
defined geographic area and within time and resource constraints,

(3) the

tension between group camaraderie and individual identity in

the expression of community needs and values, and

(4) the role of law,

rules, process, and a shared regard for the sanctity of the forum that
With each of those
facilitate the local government experience.
dynamics, there is a limit beyond which it is difficult, if not

1 76 .

The philosophical and methodological forces behind metropolitan fragmentation

in particular and the development of local government law in general are commonly
understood as localism. See, e.g., Briffault,

supra note 12, at 444; Briffault, supra note 3, at

1-6.
1 77 .

See Briffault,

supra note 3 , at 349.
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aims of effective, responsive,
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and efficient

government to be realized.
Concerns about the appropriate scale of government reflect the
values

of

competition,

choice,

decentralization of power that are
experience.

experimentalism,

and

the

sacrosanct in the American

What is often underestimated when considering the

appropriate scale for effective local government, however, is the
inherent spillovers and externalities of the regulatory decisions about
land use, which are at the core of local government's functional
purpose.

Local governments are chiefly concerned with regulating

land use because of the belief that the development and use of land can
only be determined by those who live in close proximity to one another
and therefore share the same territory.

The location of broad

regulatory authority over land use within the province of discrete
municipal units of government does not appreciate this fundamental
characteristic of land use policy. There is a fundamental indeterminacy

in the relationship between extemality management and the need for
discrete boundaries to define and delineate the limits of community
and local power.

The larger the territorial footprint, the greater the

spillover of land use decisions within formal boundaries will be into
areas outside of formal boundaries. Involuntary annexation addresses
this head-on by providing the central cities in metropolitan regions the
ability to extend boundaries to account more accurately for the
distribution of metropolitan area burdens throughout the region.
The third force at the core of localism's role in the controversy
over involuntary annexation is the manner in whic h localism
specifically through boundary policy-has served to operationalize
and reinforce a social order organized around race and economic class.
Race and class disparities color conceptions of the legitimacy of the
redistributory functions

of a c entralized

government.

Because

municipal boundaries have functioned to reinforce existing racialized
and class-based systems of privilege and disadvantage, notions of the
benefit and value to be derived from the annexation of one's land into a
municipality involve assessments about the race and class identity of
the annexing municipality itself and the potential impact that
annexation might have on one 's real or perceived property value.
While increasing wealth and income inequality in the United States is
a growing area of popular and political concern, it is in metropolitan
areas that inequality is negotiated, and it is metropolitan areas that are
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chiefly responsible for addressing wealth and income inequality and
7
stratification. 1 8
While municipal boundaries do not restrict the flow of goods,
services, and ideas within a metropolitan area, they demarcate first
class citizenship from more subordinate tiers. These particular aspects
of municipal boundaries have added stigma to residence and place,
signaling to the market those areas for investment and isolation. 119
Annexation law is central to these processes and has, in effect, given a
geographic character to race- and class-based politics.
past motives

for annexation

often have

Additionally,

intentionally

served to

reproduce existing race and class inequality, resulting in metropolitan
regions carved into racially and socioeconomically defined local
government units.1 80
Scholars have addressed the processes of
"municipal underbounding," which are those annexation practices in
which cities

grow around

or away from

low-income

minority

communities in an effort to exclude them from municipal services and

curtail their voting rights.1 8 1

With respect to economic class, there is an emerging intellectual
and political discourse about growing income and wealth inequality in
America. "[I]n

1928 the

richest I percent of Americans received 23.9

1 78. See Richard H. McAdams, Economk Costs oflnequa/jty, 20 1 0 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
23, 3 1 -33 (noting that more affluent populations are likely to segregate themselves into
homogenous communities and inherently increase violent crime because of decreased
funding for police protection in less-affiuent localities); Colloquium, Wealth Jnequa/jty a11d
the Eroding Middle Class: A Confrrence of the University of North Carolina Center on
Poverty,

Work and Opportunity and the Amencan

Constitution Society for Law and Policy,

1 5 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 4 1 1 (2008) (noting a variety of factors in income
inequality including nonpayment of estate taxes, racial history, minimum wage reform, and
social entitlement reform); Rana Foroohar, Stuck in the Middle, TIME (Aug. 1 5, 20 1 1 ),
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9 1 7 1 ,2086853,00.html (noting that affluent
individuals are able to escape taxation while impoverished individuals are thrown into greater
poverty as a result of reductions in social benefits).
1 79. See, e.g, Kenneth A. Stahl, The Suburb as a Legal Concept: The Problem of
Organization and the Fate of Municipalities in American Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REv. I 193,
1 208-09 (2008) (discussing the exclusionary ethos of constitutionalizing zoning laws and the
manner in which municipalities gained power chiefly for the purpose of shaping their
demographic makeup through exclusionary practices).
1 80. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 2, at 938-42 (discussing "municipal
underbounding" as a motivation for annexation and as a reflection of the race and class
dimensions of municipal-boundary construction and reconstruction); Gillette, supra note l
(discussing different theories and approaches to understanding the methodology of
annexation and specifically promoting concurrent majorities as a method for conducting
annexations).
1 8 1 . For a broader discussion on municipal underbounding, see, for example,
Anderson, supra note 2, at 937-42.

2012]

LOCALISM& INVOLUNTAR YANNEXA TJON

33 1

perce.nt of the nation's total income."182 Those levels declined as New
Deal reforms, the G.I. Bill, government support of homeownership
and the Great Society programs expanded the circle of prosperity. By
the late 1 970s, the top 1 % earned 8% to 9% of America's total annual
income. But after that, inequality began to widen again, and income
reconcentrated at the top. "By 2007 the richest I percent were back to
where they were in 1 928-with 23.5 percent of [total income
, ,1 3
eamed] . 8
Income inequality breeds social inequality, which increases social
distance. When considering the growth of municipal fragmentation
and the manner in which it replicates social inequality along race and
class lines, the social distance created by income inequality takes on a
territorial dimension. Many scholars argue that increased social
distance reduces trust, which leads to provincial notions of community
and linked fate.1 84 Furthermore, scholars have found that "the more a
region is broken up into multiple governments [or municipal
identities], the more racially and economically segregated its housing
market is and the slower its rate of regional economic growth."'''
Intraregional fragmentation both originates from and exacerbates
existing social stratification and weak economic growth profiles.' xr.
The rise in income inequality corresponds with the spread of
localism and municipal fragmentation. The laws affecting the
formation and reformation of municipal boundaries are one of the
many, seemingly neutral, legal regimes that ultimately reinforce
geographic segregation and the maldistribution of income, wealth, and
resources within metropolitan regions.181 The cultural legitimacy
associated with localism casts the long history of these government
created and legally legitimized devices as an unfortunate but inevitable
condition of the liberty associated with private property. The
consequences of the historic racial barriers to property ownership, the
property value premium placed on white neighborhoods, and the
racialized allocation of locational equity are transferred intergenera1 82. Raymond H. Brescia, The Cost of Inequality: Social Distance, Predatory
Conduct, and the Financial Cn:Sis, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 64 1 , 658 (201 1).
1 83 . Id
1 84. See, e.g., id at 665 (discussing the role of trust in economic exchanges and the
role of social distance in the erosion of the trust relationships necessary to prevent predatory
behavior in economic exchanges).
1 85. Rusk, supra note 1 6, at 2 (citing DAVID Y. MILLER, THE REGIONAL GOVERNING OF
METROPOLITAN AMERlCA 1 26-28 (2002)).
1 86.

See, e.g., Tyson, supra. note 2.

1 87.

See, e.g., Audrey G. Mcfarlane,

The Properties of Instab1Jity:

Predation, Racia}jzed Geogra.phy, and Property Law, 201 1 Wrs. L. REv. 855, 91 1 .

Markets,

[Vol. 8 7 : 297

TULANE LA WRE VIEW

332

tionally, and their impacts are cumulative.

These race and class

divisions are not just descriptive facets of localism's effects-they are
essential components to the social investment in localism and its
resilience as the logic driving the organization and methodology of
metropolitan politics.
It is certainly possible to overstate the influence of localism as the
sole driver of location preferences of individuals and firms and of the
desire to manipulate boundary law in service of those preferences.
Increasingly,

urban

scholars

are

highlighting

the

role

that

"agglomeration economics" plays in shaping these preferences and the
resulting decisions.188

While the agglomeration economics analysis

offers much toward understanding the logic of location in cities,
agglomeration processes are reflecting, to some degree, imbedded
social

and

.

cultural

unconsciousIy.

dynamics

that

operate

subconsciously

and

189

Localism does not only benefit those with the most economic,
social, or political power, either. For instance, the rise of black mayors
in American cities at the end of the civil rights era was facilitated by
majority-minority voting coalitions built around the racial redistri
bution of population in metropolitan areas.

Black communities, and

disfavored minorities in general, have benefited politically when
municipal-boundary law allows them to create voting majorities within
defined

territories.

The

resulting

electoral

power

facilitates

meaningful, albeit short-term, progress and provides black citizens job
opportunities in municipal government that are otherwise unavailable
in areas where they lack meaningful majorities. The very worthy aims
of

increasing

minority

political

power

and

undermining

the

fragmentation that contributes to minority economic disempowerment
190
Ultimately, the manner in which the
are often in conflict.
redistributionary import of local tax policy magnifies long-standing
racial disparities in wealth and resources renders the voting majorities
1 88 .

See,

e.g. ,

CLAYIDN

P.

GILLETTE,

LOCAL

REDISTRIBUTION

DEMOCRACY: INTEREST GROUPS AND THE COURTS 99 (20 1 1 ) ;

AND

LOCAL

EDWARD L. GLAESER, CITIES,

AGGLOMERATION AND SPATIAL EQUILIBRIUM 5 (2008).

1 8 9 . The manner in which race, class, religion, and sexual identity operate
subconsciously in a manner that drives decision making both at the individual level and at the
firm level deserves more consideration in the agglomeration economics discourse. For an
understanding of how unconscious bias operates in the racial context, see, for example,

Charles R. Lawrence III,

The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:

Reckoning with

Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN . L. REv. 3 1 7 ( 1987).

1 90 . See generally Kristen Clarke, Voting Rights & City-County Consolidations, 43
Hous. L. REV. 62 1 (2006) (arguing that city-county consolidations do not take into account
the dilution of minority voting strength).
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minority

communities.

B.

Antistatism and the Local Government Legitimacy Cnsis
Involuntary annexation is popularly understood as a direct threat

to the freedom associated with location choice and the manner in
which annexation law facilitates that choice.

What many find so

offensive and threatening about involuntary annexation is that it grants
a government body unilateral or near-unilateral power to reshape the
legal boundaries of communities not under its control. That not only
offends the communitarian spirit at the heart of localism, but also its
libertarian leanings.

Opponents of involuntary annexation view it as

an egregious example of government overreach.

A local paper in

North Carolina captured this sentiment when Keith Bost, an opponent
of involuntary annexation, stated: "Forced annexation is against every
principle and idea of our Founding Fathers and our Constitution . . . .
We have to pay taxes to people we were never allowed to vote for or
against."191 His comments capture both the depth of conviction and the
misconceptions at the heart of the backlash to involuntary annexation.
They rely heavily on a mythology about American democracy that
over-simplifies and misunderstands the ever-present dynamics of
scale, jurisdiction, and the primacy of the police power as constant
influences on the meaning of private liberty. They underestimate the
relative constructedness of municipal boundaries, the position of
localities as state instrumentalities, and their relationship to voting

rights.

The notion of government as an expression of collective liberty

and as having legitimate authority to regulate and redistribute has, to
some degree, always existed as a controversial and contested position
in American life.

Debates about the proper role and scope of

government, primarily at the federal level, but also at the state and
local level, have been present in every phase of the development of
American

democracy.

The

healthy

suspicion

of

centralized

government dates back to the arguments surrounding the ratification of
the Constitution.192

Prior

to

World

War II,

twentieth-century

progressivism emphasized the role of the state in creating institutions
191.

See Christensen, supra note 7 5 (internal quotation marks omitted) .

192. In Federalist Number 1 0, James Madison argued in favor of a strong, centralized
. a government to counterbalance the tendencies in state and local governments to
n�t10
�

�

d1scnmmate against and oppress disfavored minority groups. See, e.g , THE FEDERALIST No.
10 (James Madison).
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that would promote the public interest. 193

In the face of growing

totalitarianism abroad, however, progressivism after World War II was
curbed amidst concerns that an expanded and strengthened central
government created the preconditions for totalitarianism.194

This has

degenerated considerably, however, and the movements to oppose
involuntary annexation reflect, in some measure, a broader, deeper,
antistatist chord in contemporary American society.

In 2003, 39% of Americans polled responded that the federal
government had too much power, and that number increased to 5 1 % in
2009.195

A 20 1 0 study found that more than seven out of ten

Americans "use a word or phrase that is clearly negative when
providing a top-of-mind reaction to the federal government."1% These
views

reflect

the

unstable

prism

through

which

the

public

conceptualizes the balance between central government authority and
individual liberty and how that conception colors their view of the
legitimacy of government altogether.
The decision over the appropriate scope or scale for centralized
government may indeed result in a contraction of governmental
authority or purview.

This does not constitute a rejection of the

legitimacy of government, however. It is this distinction that separates
the debates about the appropriate scope of government in the early part
of the twentieth century from the rhetoric and ideology of late
twentieth-century society that reject the legitimacy of government that
is based, in part, on an overreliance on individualism, property rights,
and laissez-faire economics as fixed, essential, and unchanged or
unchanging components of the American experience.
While

localism

expresses

a

preference

for

small-scale

government as the most legitimate forum for democracy, antistatism is
1 93 . Many of the legislative reforms enacted during the New Deal substantially
regulated the free market in unprecedented ways for the American economy. The result was
the development of a robust social safety net that continues to characterize American life
today-specifically for the American middle class. The most important legislation from the
period was the 1 935 Social Security Act, which established a system of insurance for old age,
unemployment insurance, and welfare benefits for such protected groups as dependent
children and the handicapped. This legislation formed the basis for the modem welfare state.
See Social Security Act of 1 935, Pub. L. No. 74-27 1 , 49 Stat. 620 ( 1 935).
1 94. See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130
U. PA . L. REV. 1423, 1427 (I 982).
195. See Frank Newport, Amencans More Likely To Say Govemment Doing Too
Much, GALLUP (Sept. 2 1 , 2009), http://www.gallup.com/poll/ 1 23 1 0 1/americans-likely-say
government-doing-too-much.aspx.
1 96. Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans ' Image of "Federal Govemment" Mostly Negative,
GALLUP (Oct. 1 1 , 20 10), http://gallup.com/poll/ 143492/americans-image-federal-govemment
mostly-negative.aspx.
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highly suspicious o f any government action and sees the collective
liberty expressed through democratic government largely as an
illegitimate infringement upon private liberty and the free working of
private markets.

As is the case in traditional federalism debates, at

issue is where decision-making power should lie among competing,
interrelated, and, in some cases, overlapping governmental units. The
decision to locate decision-making authority in one forum or the other
engenders sharp sentiments not only against the selected forum, but
against the notion of divided government altogether. With regard to
local governments, involuntary annexation is one answer to the
question of what is the proper decision-making forum for municipal
boundary decisions and which autonomous entity or being-the
municipal government or the individual property owner-state law
should privilege in decisions about the placement of municipal
boundaries.

Like so many others, this choice about the appropriate

governmental forum for decision-making authority is germane to the
democratic system, as opposed to being in violation of its letter or
spirit as involuntary annexation opponents might suggest.
The fight against involuntary annexation in many ways mirrors
the ideological positions and
antistatism.

historical

interpretation

anchori ng

Both can be understood as part of the cumu lative,

ideological fallout resulting from the way certain twentieth-century
sociopolitical developments have been politicized in the popular
consciousness.

In post-World War II America, support for a strong

central government eroded due to two defining events in American
political,

economic,

and social

life:

the

federal

government's

intervention in the financial markets and economic sphere through the
Great Society-era reforms and initiatives and the federal government's
intervention in the social sphere through its involvement in race
relations. The latter set of events-the intervention of federal courts in
securing civil rights-is the most controversial and set the stage for
decades of antistatist political rhetoric and systematic withdrawal of
the federal government's presence in American life.197

197. There is an extensive body of literature on the manner in which the civil rights era
backlash shaped the public's perception of the role, effectiveness, and legitimacy of the
federal government. The 1 960s civil rights legislation and jurisprudence generated a
backlash that organized itself into a political movement and rhetorical regime that began
framing its race, class, and economic agenda in the context of a federal government, whose
reach and expansive power limited individual freedom and choice. Known popularly as
"states' rights," profederalism movements in the twentieth century were largely spurred by
ormer Confederate states' commitment to maintaining Jim Crow legal regimes free from the
mterference of the federal government, especially the federal courts. The courts' expansive

'.
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Conservative political theorists have called into question many
twentieth-century reforms and institutions that have expanded the
scope of government in service of the aims of collective liberty.198
These reforms include zoning, rent control, workers ' compensation,
and progressive taxation.199 Zoning and progressive taxation go to the
heart of local government's functions and its real and perceived
impacts on individual liberty.

They shape the composition of local

communities in a way that trumps the preferences of groups of people
desiring to order bounded communities and the built environment
according to their personal tastes, preferences, and biases, as well as
prior patterns of inequality and social stratification.
Just as suburbanization was aided by the devolution of boundary
policy to local governments from state hands in states that abandoned
involuntary and involuntaryesque modes of annexation policy, it also
spurred the increased privatization of community as an even further
reaching method of protest. This has operated to spur what has been
termed the "secession of the successful": the self-alienation, of those
who can afford to do so, from public institutions, namely public
schools, public parks, public services, and public government.

200

These

communities are united by income, consumer preferences, and a
concern for the preservation and the continued growth of property
values.

Through the use of state and local government-boundary

policy, they create enclaves where their tax dollars can go to support

vision of the regulatory power afforded to government under the Constitution was understood
as

an affront to liberty in a nation less than a century removed from a Civil War that was

popularly understood as a contest over federalism and states' rights.

For a broader analysis

and discussion of these developments, see, for example, Chri stopher J. Tyson, At the

Intersection

of Race and History:

Requirement and the Crack La ws, 5 0

The Unique Relationship Between the Davis Intent

How. L.J.

345, 367- 70 (2007) (discussing the Nixon-era

conservative movement's deployment of facially race-neutral language to rhetorically frame
policy proposals that potentially could have the same social import as the invalidated Jim
Crow regime while giving the backlash to the civil rights' rhetmical legitimacy and
mobilizing it for electoral success), and J. Clay Smith, Jr., Shifts of Federalism and Its
Implications !Or Civil Rights, 39

How. L.J.

737 ( 1 996) (discussing the civil rights implications

of United States v. Lopez, 5 14 U. S. 549 ( 1 995)).
1 9 8. Calls from conservatives for a diminished role for government have informed
debates over private property rights.

In his oft-cited 1 985 book Takings: Pn.vate Property
and the Power of Eminent Domain, Richard Epstein argues that the Framers of the
Constitution codified their beliefs on the limitations of governmental power in the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which says that "private property" cannot be taken for public

use "without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V; RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS:
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN ( 1 985).
1 99.

See Epstein, supra note 1 98.

200.

See Robert B. Reich, Secession of the Successfii/,

N .Y.

TIMES (Jan. 20, 1991)

(Magazine), http://www.nytimes.com/ 1 99 1 10 1/20/magazine/secession-of-the-successful.htrnl .

LOCALISM& INVOLUNTAR YANNEXA TION

2012]

337

their specific needs. Given that their income allows for a reduction in
the government services required by less-affluent segments of society,
their governments are relatively lean and their communities have few
unmet needs.201 In the minds of m any, this dynamic only validates the
widely held belief in the ineptness of traditional public institutions.
Privatization encompasses the processes and policies that devo lve
traditionally publicly owned and operated sectors of the economy and
civil life to private hands, as a method for organizing civil society. In
the latter quarter of the twentieth century, there was a rise in the
number of private communities and in the development of legal
innovations at the local level to effect those changes.

The rise in

common-interest communities reflects these developments as well as
the decreasing ability of municipal governments to provide services
and community amenities.

Privatization has spurred a retreat from

investment in the public sphere, while the specter of that disinvestment
unfairly undermines the public's faith in the role of government. There
exists today a considerably high level of confidence in consumer
choice

as

a means of identifying value in spheres long thought to be

distinctly public. Public goods are increasingly being transferred into
private hands, and, as such, are becoming chiefly the province of those
202
The movement toward
who support and, in turn, enj oy the benefit.
privatization in state and local government reflects not only persistent
inefficiencies in the delivery of government services but also a guiding
logic that public institutions as a rule are inferior to private, market
based ones.203 The logic of privatization serves as a powerful stimulant
to the current antistatist disposition of Americans vis-a-vis democratic
public institutions.204

20 1 .

See id

202.

The primary form of privatization involves, for instance, electric companies or

airlines being sold by government agencies to private bidders.
203.

For a broader discussion on privatization in local government law, see generally

Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold,

Hilter Privatization Trends in the United States: Human
Rights, National Security, and Public Stewardship, 3 3 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y REV.
785 (2009) (arguing that privatization of water and public water systems pose
underappreciated risks to both public rights and national security in the United States, and
suggesting limiting private control over water sources and systems, encouraging regulation of
privatization processes, and recommending more accountability from local governments as

See also Celeste Pagano , Proceed with Caution:
Avoiding Hazards in Toll Road Privatizations, 83 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 35 1 (2009) (discussing

trustees of water resources for the public).

the trends leading to the modem movement toward privatization and discussing the benefits
and drawbacks of privatized toll roads).
204.

Identifying the logic of privatization as a threat to public institutions does not

undermine the value of private, market-driven forces in public life. It does not even require
the invalidation of certain market principles in the operation of government.
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The attack on involuntary annexation reflects many currents in
the contemporary, national, conventional wisdom regarding the role of
government, abstract (and at times confused) notions of constitutional
rights and "freedom," and the role of taxation as income and wealth
redistribution for the maintenance of the public good.
conununities view themselves

as

independent

Suburban

sovereigns whose

freedom to govern is oppositional to that of the central city.
mirrors debates occurring in the context of federalism.

This

In our

collective imagination, federalism envisions states as independent
sovereigns against a separate central government.

Scholars are

challenging this view, contending instead that states are less like
sovereigns and more like servants that operate as part of a complex
system of "national, state, and local actors implementing federal
policy."205

Outside of scholarly circles, however, there is little

appreciation for the nation's system of state and local government
interdependence

and integration.

Many

view

state

and local

governments as functioning solely to provide minorities a distinct and
separate sphere of autonomy and power apart from the center.

The

intergovernmental relationships under this conception are inherently
oppositional and confrontational.
notions

of freedom as

being

When matched with widely held
synonymous with

autonomy and

exclusivity, it is possible to conceptualize the role antistatism plays in
deepening the commitment of many to

devolving control over

boundary policy to the smallest unit of government possible.
Current debates about the nature of federalism further illuminate
our understanding of the presence of antistatism in the involuntary
annexation context by exposing the flawed premises undergirding
notions of sovereignty in the first place. The autonomy gained from
the formation of separate government or the resistance to the
expansion of the territory of another government does not in any
meaningful way trump the realities of federal, state, and local
interconnectedness.
ments

As Heather Gerken has observed, local govern

are not outsiders

but rather insiders

and parties to the

implementation of state and federal policy.206 Their ability to break off
into separate communities does not effect a rejection of the central
government, but rather only shifts the dynamics of their operation

205. Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1 549, 1 557
(20 12); see also Heather K. Gerken, Federalism All the JM!y Down, 1 24 HARV. L. REV. 4
(2010) [hereinafter Gerken, Federalism] ("[E]ven as scholars reject a sovereignty account,
sovereignty continues to shape the way we think about 'Our Federalism."').
206. See Gerken, Federalism, supra note 205, at 1 3- 14.
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within a complex apparatus wherein the central government is, well, at
the center.

C

Property Rights Theory ofMunicipal Identity
The outrage over involuntary annexation is essentially outrage

over the taking of the choice to express individual identity, group
identity, status, and ownership through municipal identity. While there
is no right to local self-government, localism is expressed in the moral,
rhetorical, and methodological framework of property rights. As has
been the case in the involuntary annexation battles cited in Part II of
this Article, most argwnents against involuntary annexation

are

anchored in property rights frameworks that equate the freedom to j oin
with others and organize into new municipalities with fundamental
notions of land-based property rights.

Central to the opposition to

involuntary annexation is the notion that annexation regimes pose a
substantive threat to individual property rights.
Unlike eminent domain, zoning, or other legal regimes that
impact the use or the rights associated with private land ownership,
annexation does not impact private property rights in any meaningful
way. All land is and has always been subj ect to regulation by a number
of governing bodies, and land located within the governmenta l
subunits of state government is subj ect to the powers of the state,
however they are delegated and enforced.201

States empower their

municipalities to regulate and tax the land within their borders .
Whether that land lies within an incorporated city or within the
unincorporated areas of a county or parish, it ultimately falls under the
province of the state. The change in classification of land from being
located within the unincorporated areas of a county or parish to being
located within the boundaries of a city or other municipality simply
does not alter the fundamental relationship between the land and the
state, which has uncontested authority, either directly or indirectly,
through its subunits to regulate and tax the land.208

See generally WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW & REGULATION
1 - 1 9 ( 1 996) (rebutting the misconception that pervasive
regulations were not present in nineteenth-century America).
208. Those who oppose involuntary annexation argue that involuntary annexation
somehow represents an overextension of the historic manner in which property rights have
been regulated. This mythology undergirds much of conservative thought and rhetoric
regarding property rights but misrepresents the regulatory ethos of pre-New Deal American
life. For a broader discussion, see generally NOVAK, supra note 207 (describing the laws and
regulations of nineteenth-century America).
207.
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The movement to repeal involuntary annexation statutes has as
much to do with substantive disagreements over the scope and
operation of annexation regimes as it does with longstanding and
deeply culturally embedded conceptions of private property rights.
Just as private property boundaries grant the individual the right to
exclude others from the bundle of rights and social, political, and
economic benefits tied to private property, municipal boundaries serve
an exclusionary function by determining who gets to participate in the
redistribution of a community's resources. When considering the role
munic ipal boundaries play in shaping notions of community, the
exclusionary features of private property ownership are elevated as the
essential features worthy of attention and protection. This leads to a
crisis of political discourse where notions of private property rights are
expressed through the formation and reformation of municipal
boundaries.
There are a number of social constructs that, through their
development and popular understanding over time, have assumed
characteristics similar to property rights. The idea of property in the
public consciousness is rooted in "popularly understood and instinctive
notions of both personal identity and the inviolability of ownership."209
While local sovereignty is not recognized in our constitutionalism,
there has emerged a species of property rights borne of human
experience. Since the nation's founding, there has existed the notion
that property and citizenship are intrinsically linked. This is the ethos
of civil republicanism and the theory of property rights and liberty
held by the nation's Founders.210 The relationship between private
property rights and the perceived right to autonomous local
government has taken on popular meanings that are not always
grounded in actual law but have a real impact on politics. These
perceived rights form the ideological basis for that which is essentially
a socially constructed right to municipal identity.

209 . David Fagundes, Property Rhetonc and the Public Domain, 94 MINN. L. REV.
652, 655-56 (201 0) .
2 1 0 . D�ng the early years of the nation, there existed the belief that property
.
pro�1�ed not JUSt a stake in the action but also a sense of responsibility, a concern about the
stabil i ty of goverrunent , and a lack of dependence on others that were essential for an
intelligent , voting population. Land ownership was tied to civic identity-the right to vote
and h?ld �lected office were tied to property ownership, which is the essence of civic
repubhcamsi:i. Parts of this theory began to break down in the early years of the nineteenth
century, particularly those parts dealing with the political rights of nonlandholding men. See,
e.g., RICHARD H. CHUSED, CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS lN PROPERTY 1 7- 1 9 (3d ed.
201 0).
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Legal scholars have theorized the manner in which several social
constructs, identities, and institutions have acquired the characteristics
of property with regard to their social meanings.211 The framework of
these analyses is applicable to understanding municipal identity as
property. Municipal identity as property confers upon a community
the legal legitimation of expectations of power and control that have
been enshrined in state law without regard for the impact of that power.
If the right to municipal location has, in the public's consciousness,
developed into a constructive set of property rights, then it follows that
the corresponding sociopolitical context and legal meaning requires it

be afforded the most important and exalted constitutional protecti on
or something close to it.

When we understand municipal identity in

this vein, we can see more clearly the lengths to which individuals and
society as a whole are willing to go to protect and preserve what they
perceive to be a set of property rights.
Elevating involuntary annexation to a threat to the personal
liberty associated with location choice requires the construction of

a

right to location choice that has the force and legitimacy of law. The
idea of municipal identity as property, therefore, lies at the intersection
of the manner in which the protection of private property rights and the
development of suburban identity has organized around and

is

culturally understood as the protection of the American home.
Socially and culturally, the home is the most intimate and the most
private sphere of human activity.

The family is thought to anchor

American society, and the family is organized around the home. The
sanctity of the home and its durability as a vehicle for family wealth
creation hinge on the security and stability that flows from property
rights.
Courts have reinforced the primacy of the home through the
manner in which they have legitimated and given constitutional cover
to local zoning and land use regulations.

In

Village of Euclid

v.

Ambler Realty, the United States Supreme Court opined that the
separation of residential, business, and industrial uses would increase
the safety and security of the home.212 The Court went on to comment
specifically on the development of apartments, characterizing them as
2 1 1 . See, e.g., Cheryl I. Harris, Whjteness as Property, I 06 HARV. L .REv. 1707 ( 1 993)
(exploring the development of whiteness as a property right and presenting a framework for
how property rights are socially constructed even if not formally recognized in law); Goutam
U. Jois, Mania/ Status as Property: Toward a New Jurisprudence for Gay Rights, 4 1 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 509 (2006) (arguing that marriage should be afforded the same degree of
constitutional protection as property rights).
212. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 394 (1 926).
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parasitic to the residential character of a district.2 13 In Village ofBelle
Te1Te

v.

Boraas, the Supreme Court again singled out the private,

single-family residence for special protection by articulating the
sanctity of family values in a manner that implicitly favors the
traditional, nuclear family ideal.214
The residence-centric underpinnings of municipal identity as
property fundamentally reject the reality of interdependence and the
complex interplays between social and economic spheres of life
particularly at the local level.

Acknowledging this interdependence

does not require undermining private property as a normative position,
nor is socioeconomic equity or redistributive policy necessarily at odds
215

with private property.

There are multiple characterizations of

government and its manifestation or representation of the public
interest.216

What is clear, however, is that government, by its very

nature, is designed to socially and economically redistribute individual
property and welfare for the advancement of the broader community.
In the context of local government, that redistribution occurs through
the development of infrastructure and the delivery of public services
that make not only community possible but social and economic
relations as well.

The home and family values are the primary

beneficiaries of these redistributive processes, for they benefit most
from the stability and consistency that result from these redistributive
systems.
Just as society protects the owner's interests in land, so too does
society curtail the absoluteness of property rights for the promotion of
the best interests of society.211 This axiom has been acknowledged by
courts, and the necessity of basing judgments on the physical and
social facts of a particular time and place warrants reconsideration of

213.
2 1 4.

See id
See Village of Belle Terre v.

Boraas, 4 1 6 U.S. 1 , 9 ( 1 974) ("The police power is

not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones
where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the
area a sanctuary for people.").
2 1 5.

In articulating and defending the necessary redistributive role of government in

relation to more fundamentalist notions of private property rights, I appreciate both extremes
of he debate and make no attempt in this Article to undermine broadly recognized and
socially embedded understandings of private property rights. For a broader discussion, see

�

generally Jeffrey A Schoenblum,

Myth ofOwnership/Myth ofGovernment,

22 VA. TAX REV.

555 (2003) (reviewing LlAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OwNERSHlP: IA.XES
AND JUSTICE (2002)).
2 1 6.

See id

at 565-66 (discussing the various models of public-private interaction

between governments and the market and governments and private citizens).
2 1 7 . See, e.g., State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 373 (N.J. 197 1 ).
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the line between individual and collective rights in regulating
18
property.2
Opponents of involuntary annexation frame their opposition in
terms of liberty and the lack of liberty; however, the consideration of
involuntary annexation does not involve a zero-sum conception of
liberty. Rather, it is inherently an i ssue of which type of liberty we are
favoring, understanding that both collective liberty and individual
liberty are compromised in the involuntary annexation regime.
The control of land uses at the macro scale has evolved to be
understood as a valid "exercise of the public police power

[as opposed

to the] exercise of pn·vate liberty by neighboring landowners acting
together, out to control the landscapes that they inhabit."2 19 Municipal
fragmentation, however, begs the question of whether the private
liberty expression of municipal location choice should be subject to
the public police power to prevent the negative impact of municipal
fragmentation on metropolitan political organization and operation.
The liberty traditionally associated with property rights lies on both
sides of the argument. Determining where the line is drawn-l ike all
other laws and policies that support a property rights regime-is a
matter of lawmaking.220
If one subscribes to the view that property rights result from
utilitarian calculations as to what can be owned, what it means to own.
and the relationship between private ownership and collective liberty,
then the right to form essentially private communities through
municipal incorporation should be subject to evaluation against the
metropolitan community's right to stem the negative effects of
municipal fragmentation.221 If a key value of a property rights system
is to fulfill social needs, then involuntary annexation's ability to limit
fragmentation must be considered an equally important, if not more
important, social need.
To quote property theorist Eric Freyfogle, "[E]ach landowner's
power requires testing independently, to see whether it brings overall
social benefits."222 Private property rights are good when they yield
overall benefits that are widely spread for people generally.223
2 1 8. See id
2 1 9. See Eric T. Freyfogle, Property and Liberty, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 7 5 , 95
(20 1 0) (discussing the existence of the private control of land through homeowners'
associations and special districts) .
220. Id
22 1 .
222.

See id at 1 1 3-14.

223.

See id. at l 14-15.

See id. at 1 1 5 n. 1 5 1 .
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Freyfogle 's analysis of property rights is instructive for understanding
If one accepts that central cities

the value of involuntary annexation.

are the anchors for land use management, sociocultural identity, and
economic development needs of the metropolitan region and that the
ability to pursue the necessary redistributive aims critical to tending to
these and other issues requires that the central city have a privileged
prerogative over boundary formation and reformation throughout the
metropolitan area, then accordingly, one must acknowledge that the
absence of a meaningful ability to involuntarily alUlex land is a
massive restriction on the liberty of the metropolitan community.
The localist motivations

for municipal

autonomy are often

dressed up in libertarian garb, but these pretentions are easily
dismissed when considered in the context of the municipal formation
that is pursued.

The reality is that localists seeking municipal

autonomy from central cities are not rejecting centralized government
per se, but rather they are rejecting the current composition of the
spaces they flee.

They seek to express property rights in municipal

identity through the exclusionary conception of property.

This

exclusionary conception, or the boundary approach, is by

itself

inadequate because it says nothing about the owner's rights of use in a
thing.224 It risks conflating exclusive rights with the right to exclude.225
Central to annexation law and annexation battles is the
determination of the residents in the area to be annexed.

self

The self

determination trope is seductive even for the courts; its legitimacy is
grounded in local government law.

Ridgeland,

In

City of Jackson

v.

City of

decided by the Mississippi Supreme Court, the dissenting

opinion painted a picture of annexation power that distorts that which
is established constitutional jurisprudence.226 Writing for the dissent,
Mississippi Supreme Court Justice William Joel Blass stated:
There is much discussion about the path of the city's growth, but I
have not seen a decision which adequately explains why cities have the
right to grow by absorbing those who do not wish to be absorbed.
These hapless souls are not consulted.

They are merely selected to

provide additional revenues to be expended by those who have been
elected by others and for purposes which probably will benefit,
primarily, those who took them in.

When cities are concerned we

abandon the hallowed concept of democracy that the just powers of the

224. See Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusi0ty in Property Law.
' 58 U. TORONTO L.J.
275, 277 (2008).
225.

See id

226.

551 So. 2d 861, 869-7 0 (Miss. 1 989) (Blass, J., dissenting).
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Nations

which extend their boundaries without the consent of the occupants of
the new territory are condemned as aggressors.

Cities are merely

vibrant and growing, even if every citizen brought in is screaming in
007

protest.·-

The Ridgeland dissent hinges upon reconceptualizing the municipality
as

a nation-state and, accordingly, endowing it with the inviolable

rights of sovereignty that are commonly associated with the nation
state. It is easy to expose the manner in which this runs counter to
long-standing jurisprudence on the identity of local governments,rn but
the impulse for attempting to reconstruct the legal status of local
governments in this manner illustrates the cultural draw of municipal
identity as property.
Several state

courts

have

affirmed

that the

extension

or

contraction of a municipality's boundaries is, without exception, purely
a political matter entirely within the power of the legislature of the
state to regulate.

Furthermore, these courts have clarified that the

question of due process of law or the taking of property without
compensation has no application to the annexation of territory to a

municipality.229 Those who contend that involuntary annexation power
abridges the right to vote of those living in an area proposed for
annexation have also been rebuffed by state courts.

Several courts

have held that "the right to vote does not include a right to compel the
state to provide any electoral mechanism whatever for changes of
municipal organization."230
227. Id
228. See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907) (discussing the nature of
the relationship between municipal corporations and their residents).
229. See, e.g., State ex rel. Jordan v. City of Overland Park, 527 P2d 1340, 1 345 (Kan.
1974); Lenox Land Co. v. City of Oakdale, 125 S.W 1 089, 1091 (Ky. Ct. App. 1 9 1 0); State
ex rel Pan Am. Prod. Co. v. Texas City, 303 S.W2d 780, 783 (Tex. 1957).
230. See Bd. of Supervisors v. Local Agency Formation Comm'n, 838 P2d 1 1 98.
1204 (Cal. 1 992) ("[W]hen the state has provided for the voters' direct input, the equal
protection clause requires that those similarly situated not be treated differently unless the
disparity is justified."); see also Green v. City ofTucson, 340 F.3d 891, 896-97 (9th Cir. 2003 )
("[T]here is no inherent right to vote on municipal incorporation under the federal
constitution. However, once a state grants its citizens the right to vote on a particular matter,
such as municipal incorporation, that right is protected by the Equal Protection Clause.");
Hardin County v. City of Adamsville, No. 02A01-9203-CH-00084, 1 993 Tenn. App. LEXIS
60, at *13-14 (Ct. App. Jan. 20, 1993) ("The state, therefore at its pleasure, may modify or
withdraw all such powers, may take without compensation such property, hold it itself, or vest
it in other agencies, expand or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it with
another municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation. All this may be done,
conditionally or unconditionally, with or without the consent of the citizens, or even against
their protest. In all these respects the state is supreme, and its legislative body, conforming its
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weakens any

conception of local government as a collective enterprise as opposed to
a privatized one. Municipal boundaries implicate interests that are too
fundamental to the fate of communities, the environ ment, and the
distribution of resources w ithin metropolitan regions to be left to the
self-interest-driven ethos of localism. Likewise, the consequences of
municipal-boundary policy in the hands of local interests render
metropolitan development and equity in too fragile a state. "Property
rights serve human values."231 Likewise, municipal-boundary policy is
the ly nchpin in the expression of human values through spatial
organization and redistributive government. Just as property rights law
has long embraced the inherent tension between individual and
collective liberty in regulating property, localism must yield to
statewide boundary policy that seeks governance-regime unifonnity
over the largest territorial footprint reasonably possible to ensure that
the redistributional impact of local government tax policy and power is
equitably shared.
IV.

INVOLUNTARY ANNEXATION AND

NEW REGIONALISM

The states where involuntary annexation exists are actually the
remaining vestiges of an urban policy consensus that acknowledges
the essential role boundary law play s in shaping the metropolis.
Involuntary annexation policies perform several functions and reflect a
specific consciousness about the appropriate location for decision
making authority on boundary management.
First, involuntary annexation expresses a state's desire to impose
regionally directed land use policy on its metropolitan areas in a
manner that privileges the g rowth ambitions of central cities.

Some

may rej ect the prioritization of central cities above suburban ones as
patently

unfair

and

arbitrary.

As

central

cities

and

suburban

jurisdictions in some cases rival each other in size and character,
decisions about central city prioritization may need to be handled on
case-by -case basis.

a

But ultimately history and being first in time

action to the state Constitution, may do as it will, unrestrained by any provision of the
Although the inhabitants and property owners may, by

Constitution of the United States.

such changes, suffer inconvenience, and their property may be lessened in value by the
burden of increased taxation, or for any other reason, they have no right, by contract or
t ere
?therwise, in the unaltered or continued existence of the corporation or its powers, and h
_
_
is nothmg � e Federal Constitution which protects them from these injurious consequences.

�
�e power 1s m the state, and those who legislate for the state are alone responsible for any

llnJUSt or oppressive exercise of it.").
23 1 . State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372 (N.J. 1 971 ).
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annexation controversy realized, the infrastructural direction, social
character, economic logic, and cultural ethos of metropolitan areas are
largely driven by the central city.
Second, involuntary annexation de-emphasizes the relationship
between private property and municipal identity and favors collectivist,
centralized notions of metropolitan land use and development that are
more sustainable and produce more equitable arrangements. Land use
in the modern metropolis-as with any system of property rights
regulation-is defined by the need to identify, contain, and correct for
spillover effects. Allowing groups of metropolitan residents the ability
to deploy

boundary

policy

for the purpose of limiting

their

participation in metropolitan area 's wealth redistribution offends the
social contract.2·12

Developing public infrastructure and mitigating

spillover effects are at the core of cities' purpose. Just as zoning limits
development by placing restrictions on what can be built where,
boundaries perform a regulatory role in determining how taxes and
resources will be distributed within discrete segments of the broader
metropolis. Allowing residents to opt out of that shared enterprise will
undermine the fate of metropolitan areas.
Third, involuntary annexation expresses a conception that local
autonomy is less concerned with local government as a territorially
defined, autonomous, democratic polis but, rather, as an agent of the
state's broader ambitions

regarding

land

use

and

economic development. This keeps localism in check.

metropol itan
Broad, liberal

conceptions of local power are appropriate for addressing and
resolving any number of local disputes.

Zoning schemes, public

decency laws, and expression of community needs through local
politics are all examples of areas where local govermnents should have
wide autonomy. But the competitive imperatives of cities require that
their growth not be interrupted by provincial bands of citizens seeking
token separation from central cities.233
Last, involuntary annexation expresses a policy preference
regarding the resolution of the competing goals of increasing boundary
elasticity, maintaining the pace

of economic development,

and

232. My use of the term "social contract" relates to the political theory commonly
associated with the philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau. See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE
SOCIAL CONTRACT OR PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL RIGHT (Charles M. Shercover ed., Signet
Classics 1974) (1 762).
233 . For more information on the growth and competitive challenges confronting
cities, see Tyson, supra note 2.
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reducing social inequality. The ability of a municipality to annex land
within its metropo litan region can be a key tool in limiting urban
sprawl, municipal fragmentation, and mitigating the perpetuation of
social divisions and associated stratification within a metropolitan
region.234 It can also limit the intraregional discord that frustrates the
coordination of regional economic development.

The approaches to

involuntary annexation in states like Kansas, Nebraska, and Tennessee
show how concerns over property freedoms and the provision of
infrastructure and services can be accommodated into a compre
hensive plan.
Despite these objective benefits and the existing state regimes,
there is neither the political will nor the scholarly interest to expand or,
at the very least, defend involuntary annexation. It has largely fallen
out of favor with state and local government actors as the logic of
localism has become more ingrained. This is also true in urban studies
and with local government law scholars.

While "Regionalism" is

widely embraced, involuntary annexation is not regarded as part of the
regulatory toolbox available to make Regionalism real.
Regionalism has long been offered up as the antidote to localism.
Regionalism proposals take many forms and generally can be aligned
along a spectrum ranging from voluntary forms to involuntary,
coercive

forms.

intergovernmental

The voluntary end
agreements

of the

spectrum includes

that facilitate cooperative decision

making between and among two or more governments and the
development of regional authorities or other entities that manage and
control certain local government functions, such as land use planning,
transportation planning, and environmental regulation across a number
of separate and autonomous local government units.235
On the opposite end of the spectrum are annexation laws, limits
on municipal incorporation within established metropolitan areas,
consolidations, and other measures that impose Regionalism directives
on localities through the force of state law. As a method for achieving
regional gove1nance, annexation is thought to exist at the coercive or
involuntary extreme. As a creature of state policy, its authority is not
derived from local politics but rather state-level politics.

Interlocal

cooperative agreements, on the other hand, are entered into voluntarily
by consenting local governments.236
234.
235
·

See id
See discussion supra note 1 3 (discussing the Twin Cities region) .

�36. Interlo�al agreements can take
many forms, including regional service-sharing
. . .
imtiativ
es and regional tax-sharing initiativ
es. Most maj or metropolitan areas and many
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But these regional cooperative agreements and schemes, in most
instances, do not alter the distribution of metropolitan problems and
persistent socioeconomic disparities. If states have a vested interest in
developing and advancing an urban policy regime that will secure the
general welfare and economic fate of their metropolitan regions, then it
follows that the delineation of those metropolitan units of government
through policies that regulate the formation and reformation of
boundaries must be central to the regime. If boundary formation and
reformation is not appreciated as a core component of a statewide
urban policy regime, or if it is separated out from a broader urban
policy regime through the devolution of annexation decisions to local
property owners, then the entire urban policy apparatus is weakened
because, by its nature, it must exist at the state level as opposed to the
local level.
Regionalism has evolved into New Regionalism, which is
centered around:

"( 1 ) equity and inclusion [among] self-defined

(2) democratic participation;" and (3) the

territorial communities;

efficient and transparent delivery of government services and public
goods.237 The New Regionalist agenda-like "old" Regionalism and
other critiques of local government law and metropolitan governance
generally-is concerned chiefly with presenting a methodological and
structural counterweight to the tendency toward localism in local
government law. In this vein, it is presented as "a law refmm strategy
that responds to local government law's failure to:

( 1 ) resolve cross

(2) promote regional equity amongst
interdependent localities; and (3) foster participation and collaboration

border, multi-issue challenges;
across local boundaries."238

A key tenant of New Regionalist efforts is the establishment of
"principally voluntary

methods

of promoting

local government

cooperation in metropolitan regions."239 Voluntary cooperation through
horizontal governance measures is believed to be a sufficient vehicle
for achieving regional objectives without broaching the difficult topic
of

governmental

structure .240

midsize ones employ some

This

preference

establishes

a

of regional tax-sharing schemes. See Anita A. Summers,
URBAN-SUBURBAN
INTERDEPENDENCIES 1 8 1 , 1 88-89 (Rosalind Greenstein & Wim Wiewel eds., 2000)
(discussing a study of twenty-seven large metropolitan areas).
237. Alexander, supra note 13, at 632 (citing Cashin, supra note 9, at 2028).
238. Id al 633 .
239. Frances Frisken & Donald F. Norris, Regionalism Reconsidered, 23 J. URB. A.FF.
467, 468 (2001 ).
240. See id
form

Regionalization Efforts Between Big Cities and Their Suburbs, in
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voluntary/involuntary rubric for understanding Regionalist proposals
that overfocuses on the former because of the real and perceived
political infeasibility of the latter.

Therefore, in the context of New

Regionalism, annexation itself has been referred to as a "radical
approach."241
The voluntary nature of the alternatives to annexation is the
central challenge facing New Regionalist proposals. New Regionalist
proposals must always contend with the cultural investment in localism
that makes acquiescence to new, voluntary regional governance
regimes as dubious as increased popular support for more top-down
approaches such as involuntary annexation.242
The commitment, both in local government law and New
Regionalism, to equity and inclusion among "self-defined territorial
communities" is at the core of the crisis existing within local
government law. This self-definition aspect of territorial community
boundary formation is an intrinsic component to any conception of
local autonomy.

The inclusion of "self-defined" in the definition of

the communities New Regionalists seek to engage necessarily results
in the reproduction, rather than the mitigation, of the forces underlying
and consequently

localism

undermines the rationale

supporting

regional cooperation through structural autonomy-limiting measures.
The overfocus on voluntary approaches seeks to achieve the
of

benefits

centralization

while

decentralized governance patterns.

preserving

legally

sanctioned,

Governance uniformity increases

economies of scale, reduces the social costs of fragmentation, limits
externalities stemming from parochialism, and provides for greater
consideration and provisions for minority and disadvantaged groups.
Decentralization is good for many facets of local government law, but
boundary

management

simply

does

not

lend

itself

well

to

decentralized forms.243
24 1 . See David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, J 1 6 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2262
(2003) ("The most radical approach [to comba tting sprawl] would replace existing cities and

suburbs with full-fledged regiona l governments, e i ther through the annexa t i on of outlying
areas by the central c ity or consolida tion of a ll the jur isdict ions w i thin a metropolitan
region.").
242.

Id

243 . See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, ''A Government of Limited and Enumerated
Powers'�· In Defense ofUni ted Sta tes v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 780-84 ( 1 995). While

Calabresi ultima tely argues tha t decentraliza tion poses more benefits than centralization, he
notes that na tional governments a re more apt to solve certain problems such as ( 1 ) those
problems tha t sma ll uni ts cannot perform due to econom ies of sca le, (2) ensuring uni formity
and thus a reduction of social costs, (3) l imiting externalities, and (4) protecting minority
popula tions. See id; see also DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE (1 995)
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State annexation regimes should include provisions that give the
central cities within metropolitan regions the unilateral ability to
expand their borders when the health, vitality, solvency, economic
development, and competitiveness of the metropolitan region is
objectively at risk. These provisions must include meaningful
opportunities for citizens in the area proposed for annexation to be
aware of the proposed annexation, ensure that their service levels and
the character of the services presently received are in no way
diminished, and present objective reasons why they should be spared
annexation within the context of disallowing defensive incorporation
or similar preemptive actions and motivations. But these accom
modations ultimately should be subordinate to a state's need to ensure
the orderly, sustainable, and equitable development of its metropolitan
regions.
Central to the question of what the reach and nature of municipal
power to annex adjacent and nearby lands should be is whether policy
rationales-here, sound urban planning objectives-should play a role
in deciding which liberties to protect and which to sacrifice. This
requires determining where the line between where private property
and liberty, as expressed by community-sanctioned policy aims, is best
drawn. It is possible to see involuntary annexation as an antidote to the
specter of private municipal developments created under the auspices
of individual citizens seeking communities that match their particular
needs and profile. Increased municipal fragmentation inevitably
means private landowners acting together to create communities that
limit the redistributory reach of their tax revenues, as opposed to a
broader and more diverse demographic of citizens that may exist in a
central city.244
V.

CONCLUSION

Involuntary annexation can aid in the establishment of a new,
metropolitan localism that recognizes the ability to achieve governance
uniformity across the broadest territorial footprint possible as critical
to the growth prospects for the metropolitan region. Through the
adoption of policies that are conscious of the manner in which
(discussing the n eed for a strong nationa l authority a n d the necessity of federalism as a
restraint on that authority); David J. Barron, A Localist Critique ofthe New Federalism, 5 1
DUKE L.J. 377, 378 (20 0 1 ) (advocatin g for a more localized form o f decision making in light
ofthe rise of"new federa lism").
244. See Freyfogle , supra note 2 1 9, at 95 (discussin g the existence of the private
control ofland through homeowners' associations and special districts).
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municipal identity has been constructed into a property right.
localism's stranglehold on the future prosperity and vitality of thl'
American metropolis can be dismantled. New Regionalists, therc ti.>rl'.
have a vested interest in the defense and maintenance of involunta�
annexation. While there are certainly well-reasoned justifications for
focusing

on

more

voluntary,

bottom-up

governance

structures.

involuntary annexation remains a potent tool for facilitating regional
governance and is worthy of defense and preservation.

